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Abstract
This thesis investigates a number of issues caused by informational asymmetries 
between firms and investors. It looks at two situations where problems arise because 
of asymmetric information, and examines possible solutions, and presents one case 
where asymmetric information is the solution to a problem.
The first situation developed in chapter two provides a theoretical explanation 
based on reputational concerns for why certification intermediaries like rating agencies 
may exhibit excess sensitivity to the business cycle and for differences in ratings across 
agencies. It also analyses how competition in this industry affects the behaviour 
of these intermediaries and how this depends on reputational disparities among the 
different competitors.
Chapter three looks at the impact of auditor rotation on the gathering and dis­
closure of information about projects taking into account that longer auditor tenures 
can generate substantial savings in information collection costs but also make auditors 
more willing to preserve future expected rents and private benefits. It also shows that 
the regulation of auditing procedures becomes less relevant if accounting transparency 
increases.
In contrast with the previous two cases, the next chapter finds that co-ordination 
failures among small creditors during debt renegotiation can be mitigated by the pres­
ence of a large and more informed creditor or by a voting requirement. It examines 
how the strength of these effects depends on the relative precision of private informa­
tion of the small and large creditors and provides a rationale for a diversified capital 
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Akerlof’s ’’lemons” paper sparked renewed interest on the implications of asymmetric 
information in market efficiency. The issue of asymmetric information was before 
addressed by Vickrey (1961) and Mirrlees (1971) for example, but it was Akerlof’s 
paper that showed that informational asymmetries can give rise to adverse selection 
in markets. The idea is very simple: the fact that the owner of a car knows more 
about it than any potential buyer, leads the potential buyer to assume that any used 
car has a high probability of being low quality, i.e. a lemon. This causes them to bid 
down the price of used cars in general which ends up driving high quality used cars 
out of the market.
A key insight of the ’’lemons” paper is that economic agents may have strong 
incentives to offset the undesirable effects of information problems in market efficiency. 
In fact, Akerlof argues that many market institutions may be regarded as emerging 
from attem pts to resolve problems due to asymmetric information.
Given this it is very important to assess whether this type of institutions reach the 
goals for which they were created. Hence, this thesis looks at two institutions, more
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precisely rating agencies and audit firms, and assesses whether the way they function 
impacts on the objective to overcome asymmetries of information between firms and 
investors.
On the other hand, asymmetric information between agents can also be used to 
solve problems that arise when agents are imperfectly informed. The last chapter 
focus on the role of a large player in solving or helping to attenuate co-ordination 
problems between the remaining players when these are small and the large player is 
better informed.
Research Agenda
Berle and Means (1933) were among the first to identify asymmetric information 
as a problem for firm management. They labelled it the ’’problem of the separa­
tion of ownership and control” and provided the basis for the principal-agent models 
developed by Ross (1973) and Townsend (1979) among others.
In reality, the ownership structure of firms nowadays is a lot more complex than 
what these models implicitly assume and investors are in general dispersed and more 
often than not do not even know the people in charge of the firms they own or are plan­
ning to invest in. Hence, institutions where created with the purpose of transmitting 
timely and reliable information about firms to investors with the purpose of helping 
them in their investment decisions. These are financial certification intermediaries 
such as rating agencies and audit firms.
The role of intermediaries in general is discussed by Leland and Pyle (1977) that 
presents them as a way to facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers that are 
asymmetrically informed. Allen (1990), on the other hand, points out that because 
the original seller only captures a portion of his information’s value due to lack of
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reliability, there is an opportunity to make profits on the remaining value and this is 
captured by an intermediary.
Papers that are closest to the way this thesis approaches the topic of financial 
intermediation are for example Millon and Thakor (1985), Ramakrishnan and Thakor 
(1984), Biglaiser (1993) and Biglaiser and Friedman (1994), where intermediaries are 
agents with expertise in certification, screening and monitoring.
Some of these papers present this type of intermediaries as a solution to solve 
informational asymmetries but do not explicitly address the incentive problems and 
reputational issues they are faced with. As Crawford and Sobel (1984) demonstrates, 
a sender of information has problems convincing the receivers of the reliability of the 
information provided if their interests are not perfectly aligned1. Therefore, chapters 
two and three of this thesis contribute to this literature by looking at how incentives 
and reputational issues affect certification intermediary in their role of transmitting 
reliable information to investors.
• Financial Certification via Ratings
Firms hire certification intermediaries like rating agencies if they expect investors 
to use the information they provide in their investment decisions. As a consequence, 
rating agencies worry about how they are perceived by the market, i.e., worry about 
reputation. One way to consolidate reputation is to avoid making mistakes, and hence 
to use all available information, both public (e.g. accounting statements) and non­
public (e.g. confidential interviews) in their rating decisions. But empirical evidence 
seems to suggest that ratings tend to reflect market sentiment. Thus, reputational
1In contrast with Crawford and Sobel (1984), where reports are not verifiable, strategic informa­
tion transmission with verifiable reports is discussed in Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Okuno- 
Fujiwara, Postlewaite and Suzumura (1990).
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concerns seem to generate conflicting incentives for certification intermediaries: an 
accurate report should incorporate private information but when an intermediary is 
✓ unsure of her private information reporting according to public consensus might be re­
garded as the best way to prevent mistakes and consequently, to preserve reputation. 
The second chapter of this thesis takes into account this trade-off and assesses whether 
certification intermediaries that worry about reputation transmit reliable information, 
and in what way the structure of the certification industry affects information trans­
mission.
In this model there is a different firm each period trying to raise funds for a new 
project that hires a certification intermediary to emit an opinion about the quality 
of this project. This opinion is based on private information collected by the inter­
mediary and is going to affect the price of the new funds raised by the firm. Market 
conditions and the firm’s past history determine the existing public information about 
the quality of the project that complements the message sent by the intermediary. 
However, both investors and firms are unsure about how much to trust this message 
as the intermediary might, or might not, make mistakes when assessing the firm, i.e. 
might be untalented or talented. At the end of the first period, investors have the 
chance to update their belief about the intermediary’s type by comparing the message 
sent with the true state in case the project is undertaken. Reputation in this context 
translates the beliefs of investors about the certification intermediary’s ability.
This chapter shows that in some situations a certification intermediary that has 
reputational concerns and is unsure about her private signal chooses to ignore it 
and conform instead to the public information available about the project if these 
two pieces of information contradict each other. This can happen whenever public 
information is extreme, i.e. when public information is predominantly very good or
12
very bad. For example, if investors expect a firm to be good and the intermediary 
private information indicates that the firm is bad, there are situations where she 
chooses to report that the firm is good. However, an intermediary that is sure of her 
private signal always reports truthfully.
Intermediaries perceived by the market as more talented, tend to issue less favourable 
reports with greater frequency than more favourable ones. This happens because there 
is an asymmetry of observability in the model: a project issued with an unfavourable 
report is not undertaken and this limits the learning process about the certification 
intermediary’s type. This combined with the fact that the more reputable an inter­
mediary is, the less she benefits from issuing a report that turns out to be correct and 
the more she loses when proven to be wrong, results in more reputable intermediary 
being more prone to sending unfavourable reports when the prior is relatively low or 
relatively high than a less reputable one.
Finally, competition in the certification industry forces an intermediary to is­
sue more favourable reports. The difference is that in the new setting sending an 
unfavourable report also carries disadvantages: reputation might decrease and this 
might compromise the chances of being hired next period. This happens because, 
even though the project is not undertaken, investors have an initial opinion about 
its quality. Hence, if they are faced with an unfavourable report when they believe 
very strongly that the project is good they suspect that the intermediary has made a 
mistake and consequently, that they are more likely to be dealing with an untalented 
intermediary. And it can even happen that only favourable reports are issued. This is 
the case if the reputational levels between two competitors are very similar and send­
ing anything else other than a correct favourable report decreases reputation below 
that of the competitor resulting in the latter being hired in the following period.
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The issues addressed in this chapter are relevant for policy-makers. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision has put forward regulatory proposals that would 
require banks to use a standardised approach to calculating their minimum required 
capital based on the credit ratings assigned to the companies to which they lend. 
However, the results derived in this chapter cast doubts about how appropriate the 
use of ratings is as a device for risk management: if rating agencies rely excessively on 
public information they tend to behave in a pro-cyclical way and as a consequence, 
bank capital requirements will tend to be higher during downturns, further reducing 
credit supply during these periods.
• Accounting Audits
Auditors are certification intermediaries that are hired by firms to make sure that 
the information given to investors about the firm’s financial accounts during a certain 
period of time is correct. Basically, an auditor’s job is to validate the manager’s 
report about the firm’s accounts and this is necessary because managers might have 
incentives to bias reports in their own favour. In particular, they might derive private 
benefits of control and therefore be biased towards continuing projects that should be 
terminated.
However, in recent years many accounting irregularities have been left undetected 
for long periods of time which raises questions about current auditing procedures. 
In order to avoid further accounting scandals the Sarbanes-Oxley Act established, 
among other things, that partners of accounting companies supervising the external 
audit have to rotate regularly.
Empirically, several studies have concluded that the frequency of accounting re­
statements increases with the length of auditor tenure. This might be the case because
14
if an auditor knows she is going to remain on the firm for a sufficiently long period 
she feels tempted to delay the announcement of ’’bad news” in order to protect the 
expected rents from a continued engagement with the firm. But on the other hand, in 
a situation where auditors can make mistakes and have the possibility to revise their 
initial audit reports, having an auditor that is more familiar with the firm means that 
she is more efficient when looking for genuine mistakes.
Hence, the model developed in this chapter takes into account this trade-off while 
looking at how rotating an auditor affects the gathering and disclosure of information 
about the quality of a project.
Auditing requires a certain level of effort to collect private information and results 
in either a good report, implying that the project should continue, or a bad report 
meaning that the project should be terminated. Auditors make a mistake when they 
incorrectly identify a bad project as a good one and as a result, an audit report can be 
subject to a revision by either the same or a different auditor. In addition, managers 
can tempt auditors with private benefits that will be received by one auditor only 
provided that the project continues. This makes it harder for the firm’s shareholders 
to convince an auditor to be truthful about a bad private signal. Hence, the firm’s 
shareholders need to provide incentives for the gathering and disclosure of information 
in two consecutive audits (if needed) bearing in mind that auditors should report bad 
private signals immediately rather than delaying its announcement and adjusting the 
transfer made to auditors for the existence of private benefits.
The optimal contract rewards auditors when their reports are correct and the re­
ward is higher when they contradict previous reports or make correct announcements 
that ex-ante appear less likely given what is publicly known about the quality of the 
project. Private benefits decrease the transfers made to auditors for correct good
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reports but increase the transfers for correct bad reports as in this case the auditor 
clearly foregoes the private benefit. Limited liability determines that if the private 
benefit exceeds a certain threshold, auditors extract extra rents because transfers 
cannot be negative.
Familiarity with the firm’s accounting procedures establishes tha t if the same 
auditor performs a second audit, the cost to gather information for the second time 
is lower. As a result, and given that auditors are paid to be compensated for effort 
exertion, one would expect these payments to decrease the lower the effort cost is. 
However, the model concludes that this effect is limited and when the new cost of 
effort is lower than a certain threshold some of the payments need to increase because 
if they continue adjusting to even lower effort costs in the second audit, an auditor 
no longer finds it worth it to exert effort the first time she audits the firm’s accounts 
and as a result, effort is never exerted.
Rotating auditors is preferred by the firm’s shareholders when their initial opinion 
about the quality of the project is lower than a certain threshold. This happens 
because if they expect the project to be bad, transfers for correct good reports, which 
are lower in the single auditor case, are less likely to be paid and auditors are instead 
more likely to be rewarded for a correct bad report in the first audit, which is higher in 
the single-auditor case to prevent her from delaying the announcement of bad reports. 
If familiarity with the firm generates savings in information collection, the threshold is 
lower than before but the existence of private benefits crowds out this positive effect.
• Renegotiation Procedures
Finally, chapter four looks at a slightly different situation. The focus is still on 
asymmetric information between firms and investors, but a further level of asymme­
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try of information is introduced, i.e., there is asymmetric information between two 
different types of investors. This chapter shows how having a large and better in­
formed investor/creditor can help resolving co-ordination problems among a group of 
small investors/creditors, when they are faced with the need to renegotiate their debt 
claims. In some sense, the large creditor can, in some circumstances, act as a certifier 
of the value of the firm towards the remaining creditors.
The investors base available to provide financing to a firm is significantly broadened 
when bond issues as well as bank loans are used to issue capital. The downside is that 
co-ordination problems might arise in case a renegotiation is needed. For example, in 
the situation where a debtor fails if an insufficient number of bondholders agrees to 
accept an exchange offer, each bondholder may only want to accept the offer provided 
that the other bondholders accept it as well. This can lead to a situation where 
restructuring fails, even though creditors would be best served by agreeing to it.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the role of voting requirements that are 
widely attached to public debt restructurings and the impact of a large creditor, for 
example a bank, in the resolution of financial distress, in particular, how they perform 
as co-ordination devices in the renegotiation of public debt.
In this model there is a financially distressed firm with outstanding private and 
public debt and each creditor must decide independently whether or not to agree with 
a reorganisation plan proposed by the firm. The reorganisation plan is similar to a 
debt-to-equity exchange offer and both the large creditor and a critical majority of 
small creditors need to restructure their claims or the firm will otherwise be liquidated. 
If renegotiation succeeds, the firm cannot continue its activity unless it replaces each 
claim that was withdrawn by new and more expensive funds.
This chapter argues that the existence of a large creditor can facilitate the reor­
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ganisation of public debt but this depends on how informed she is relative to small 
creditors. Hence, when renegotiation takes place simultaneously and the large cred­
itor is perfectly informed, and more informed than the remaining creditors, small 
creditors always agree to renegotiate and let the decision of the large creditor deter­
mine the outcome of renegotiation. This happens because renegotiation is successful 
if the large creditor also accepts to exchange her claim and small creditors know that 
because she is precisely informed she will not let the firm continue for it to default in 
the last period. When the large creditor decision is announced before renegotiation 
takes place, small creditors simply mimic the large creditor’s behaviour. On the other 
hand, the large creditor plays an insignificant role when small creditors are those 
whose information is precise.
As far as the voting requirement is concerned, it becomes more relevant as a co­
ordination device the lower the informational advantage of the large creditor is. In 
fact, it is derived that renegotiation is always easier in a game with voting require­
ments than in a game without, for any level of relative precision of private information 
between the two groups of creditors (except when the large creditor is the only creditor 
that is precisely informed). This happens because the existence of the voting require­
ment puts a limit to the number of creditors withdrawing their claims, limiting as 
well the number of claims replaced by new and more expensive funds.
These results suggest that the mix of private and public debt is an important 
determinant of a distressed firm’s ability to restructure out-of-court but it shows 
that a capital structure with multiple investors and different debt classes does not 
necessarily make renegotiation more difficult than with only one type of claim and 
provides an rationale for a diversified capital structure based on the informational 
role that some creditors might have in case of financial distress.
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These chapters add to the discussion of how to mitigate asymmetric information 
between a firm and its investors. The first two situations discuss some of the problems 
caused when markets attem pt to overcome this asymmetric information but in the 
last one it is presented as the solution to reach a desirable outcome.
A summary of conclusions and outlook for future research is given in chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Conform ity and C om petition in 
Financial Certification
2.1 Introduction
Certification intermediaries in financial markets provide information to investors about 
the value of firms or other economic entities that approach them. Examples of such 
intermediaries are credit rating agencies and auditing firms. Reputation is the main 
asset of these intermediaries, since it confers credibility to their announcements and 
consequently makes firms hire their services. The Economist1 summarises the impor­
tance of reputation for rating agencies as follows:
’’Even more than for accountants and lawyers, rating agencies must 
trade on their reputations. If, for example, bond investors lose faith in the 
integrity of rating agencies’ judgements, they will no longer pay attention 
to their ratings; if rating agencies’ opinions cease to affect the price that
1”Use and Abuse of Reputation”, Economist, April 6, 1996.
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borrowers pay for capital, issuers will not pay their fees. So market forces 
should make rating agencies careful of their good names” .
Therefore, one would expect reputational concerns to be a strong motive for them 
to try hard not to make mistakes and to use all available information, both public (e.g. 
accounting statements) and non-public (e.g. confidential interviews) when reporting 
their judgements to investors. But in reality, reputational concerns seem to generate 
conflicting incentives for certification intermediaries: an accurate report should in­
corporate private information but reporting according to public beliefs might be the 
best strategy for intermediaries whose private information is imprecise. This chapter 
takes into account this trade-off and assesses whether certification intermediaries that 
worry about reputation transmit reliable information, and in what way the structure 
of the certification industry affects information transmission.
In 2001, credit raters failed to downgrade Enron to below-investment grade until 
four days before the company filed for bankruptcy. In fact, by the time investors 
services like Moody’s began cutting Enron’s ratings, bond traders had already been 
trading Enron at junk levels for several weeks and common stock had dramatically 
fallen to a seven year low. Quoting Chairman Joe Lieberman:
”In the Enron case (...) credit raters appear to have been no more 
knowledgeable about the company’s problems than anyone else who was 
following its fortunes in the newspapers.”
WorldCom bonds had also collapsed to junk levels weeks before the company’s 
rating was downgraded and this happened only about a month before the company 
disclosed nearly $4 billion in improper accounting.
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In the context of the Asian crisis, Reinhart (2002) and Ferri, Lui and Stiglitz (1999) 
describe how agencies also failed to give warning signals until after the turbulence in 
the Asian markets had begun. However, when the crisis was actually spreading, there 
was widespread downgrading of the Southeast-Asian issuers.
These facts raise several questions regarding the informational value of ratings. 
Downgrades seem to have reflected information that market participants had already 
previously incorporated in the pricing process and in some cases, they occurred after 
the rated entities had themselves disclosed substantially increased risk. Nonetheless, 
the information rating agencies provide is widely used for purposes that reach far 
beyond the intention to mitigate asymmetric information among market participants. 
For example, there are proposals to use ratings for regulatory purposes: the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision intends to see borrowers’ credit ratings included 
in assessments of the adequacy of bank’s capital. For this reason, it is of foremost 
importance to understand how rating agencies behave and which mechanisms can be 
put into practice to increase the credibility of their announcements.
In the model developed below there exists public as well as private information 
about the quality of the firm and both investors and firms are unsure about the (mo­
nopolistic) certification intermediary’s type: she might, or might not, make mistakes 
when assessing the firm (be untalented or talented). This chapter shows that in some 
situations an untalented certification intermediary chooses to conform to the public 
information going against what her private information indicates because of fears of 
being wrong, in which case she would have to bear a heavy reputational cost. As 
a result, this can happen whenever public information is extreme, i.e. when public 
information is predominantly very good or very bad. For example, if investors expect 
a firm to be good and the intermediary’s private information indicates that the firm
22
is bad, there are situations where she chooses to report that the firm is good and 
vice-versa.
Moreover, whenever the prior belief is not very informative, i.e. for medium values 
of the prior, conservatism might arise as an untalented intermediary prefers issuing bad 
reports even though her private signals was positive. And more reputable certification 
intermediaries, i.e. intermediaries perceived by the market as more talented and that 
are in fact untalented, tend to issue less favourable reports with greater frequency than 
more favourable ones for a given prior. This happens because there is an asymmetry 
of observability in the model: a project issued with an unfavourable report is not 
undertaken and this limits the learning process about the certification intermediary’s 
type, which makes sending unfavourable reports a safer option. In addition, the more 
reputable an intermediary is the less she benefits from issuing a report that turns out 
to be correct and the higher the loss she incurs into when proven to be wrong.
Finally, the model concludes that the presence of a potential competitor forces a 
certification intermediary to issue more favourable reports: it makes her more aggres­
sive and opt for the riskier option more frequently. It can also force more reputable 
certification intermediaries to abandon their conservative behaviour. The difference 
is that in the new setting sending an unfavourable report also carries disadvantages: 
reputation might decrease and this might compromise the chances of being hired next 
period.
All these conclusions hold even though the model abstracts from conflicts of in­
terest, communication between firms and certification intermediaries, repeated rela­
tionships between firms and intermediaries and bribes.
Empirically, several studies addressed the informational value of ratings but the 
results have been inconclusive. Looking at the US corporate bond market, Katz
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(1974) finds that bond prices adjust to rating changes and that there is no price 
movement prior to the announcement of a rating change, suggesting that this change 
is not anticipated by investor. In contrast, Hettenhouse and Sartoris (1976) and 
Weinstein (1977) conclude that bond prices react to other information released prior 
to the rating change. More recently, Heinke and Steiner (2001) examine daily excess 
Eurobond returns associated with announcements of watchlistings and rating changes 
by S&P and Moody’s. They find significant price changes up to 100 trading days prior 
to the rating change. Moreover, bond prices still react to the actual announcements 
of downgrades but upgrades do not seem to cause any effect in prices. Finally, Amato 
and Furfine (2003) find that, for a set of observations where a rating has either just 
been issued or changed, ratings exhibit excess sensitivity to the business cycle.
The model developed here is also related to the literature on reputational concerns 
and information transmission, in which Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Morris 
(2001) are major contributors. Both papers build on Crawford and Sobel (1982) 
and Sobel’s (1985) papers by developing repeated cheap talk models where there 
is a sender of information, i.e. the equivalent to the certification intermediary in 
this model, whose type (honest or strategic) is unknown to receivers. Benabou and 
Laroque (1992) assume the honest sender always reports her signal and, because 
private information is noisy, they conclude that a strategic sender can manipulate 
information without risking losing all her credibility as predictions which turn out to 
be incorrect can always be attributed to an honest mistake. Morris (2001) endogenises 
the behaviour of the honest sender and shows that she can also have incentives to lie 
in order to enhance reputation. However, both papers abstract from the role of public 
information. Moreover it seems more suitable to assume a sender that is primarily 
concerned with maximising profits as rating agencies and auditing firms are private
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companies2. Reporting a message that differs from the private signal in this model 
originates from the fact that the intermediary wants to maximise profits, and therefore 
her reputation, but is unsure about how much she can trust her private signals.
Reputational concerns and conflicts of interest for investment banks and equity 
analysts have been covered by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994b) and Morgan and 
Stocken (2003). The former model reputation by investment banks in the equity 
market, while the latter, develop a static cheap talk model of information transmission 
for financial analysts. They both assume that compensation is contingent on the 
message sent, unlike the model developed below where the intermediary fee is paid 
upfront and before any assessment is performed by the certification intermediary.
There are also papers that address competition and information transmission. 
Examples are the models by Lizzeri (1999) and Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2004). 
Lizzeri (1999) discusses the role of intermediaries who search out the information of 
privately informed agents and then decide what to disclose to the uninformed ones. 
Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2004) look at competition between investment banks 
that help clients, whose type is only known by the bank, to choose the appropriate 
financial product. Both models abstract from reputational issues whereas the model 
developed here explicitly models reputation using Bayesian updating.
Finally, this chapter is also related to the literature on career concerns, whose 
seminal papers are Holmstrom (1999) and Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986). 
Later developments are Scharfstein and Stein (1990) on career concerns and herd 
behaviour, Prat (2003) on career concerns and transparency and Boot, Milbourn and
2For example, Moody’s is a public company and was until 2000 a subsidiary of Dun&Bradstreet, 
Standard&Poors is a subsidiary of MacGraw-Hill and Fitch , which resulted from the merge of 
Fitch IBCA Investors Service, Inc. and Duff&Phelps Credit Rating (DCR), is owned by a French 
conglomerate, FIMALAC SA.
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Thakor (2002) on the delegation of ideas.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the basic 
characteristics of the monopolistic model and section 2.3 looks at a benchmark case. 
Section 2.4 contains the equilibrium analysis and comparative statics. In Section
2.5 competition is introduced and Section 2.6 concludes. Some proofs are in the 
Appendix.
2.2 The M odel
In this economy, there are three different classes of risk-neutral agents: investors (the 
market), a certification intermediary (she) and a firm or its manager. The model 
lasts for two periods and the risk-free interest rate is zero. At each date, there is 
a firm that needs to undertake an investment project that lasts for one period. At 
the end of the period the project either succeeds, and its proceeds are distributed to 
the firm’s holders, or it fails and the firm is liquidated. Market conditions determine 
the expected liquidation value that to simplify is normalised to zero. The current 
holders of the firm are liquidity/credit constrained thus the firm cannot undergo the 
new project unless it succeeds in obtaining financing in the form of an extra loan. In 
order to obtain this loan the firm needs to be evaluated by a certification intermediary. 
This may be because creditors are small and dispersed and information is difficult to 
gather on an individual basis or it might constitute an institutional requirement3. The
3Ratings are used in prudential supervision in a large number of countries. For example, of 
the 12 BIS Basel Committee in Banking Supervision countries, 11 did so in 2000. In the US it 
goes back to 1931 when regulators either banned some institutional investors from holding securities 
that fell below a certain grade or specified capital requirements for holding securities that were 
geared to their ratings. At present, institutional investors, pension and mutual funds and insurance 
companies, that are among the largest purchasers of fixed-income securities, all use credit ratings to 
comply with regulatory requirements that require them to maintain certain minimum credit ratings 
for investments. Financial regulators also use ratings in a similar way for safety regulation of broker-
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certification intermediary sends a message to investors based on public information 
and on the information she collects about the quality of the firm. The model studies 
the distortions to the report that the intermediary issues each period as she considers 
how it affects her future reputation and profits.
2.2.1 Agents and Basic Set-up
The firm’s initial market value is V, with V  > l 4 and the firm needs a loan of \  to
invest in a project essential to the continuation of its activity. The project can be of 
two types /, Good ( /  =  G) or Bad ( /  =  B). For simplicity, it is assumed that a G 
project has a payoff of 1, while a B  project pays off 0.
The debt market is characterised by asymmetric information. The firm’s manager,
that acts on behalf of the current holders of the firm, knows the project’s type but 
also that the firm will only continue provided that the project is undertaken and that 
he will be unemployed otherwise . Therefore, even if a project is of the B  type (and 
generates 0) the manager has incentives to persuade external investors to participate. 
Investors however, cannot tell good firms from bad ones. The firm’s previous history 
and general conditions of the economy determine the common prior over the quality of 
the project. Therefore pr(G) equals 6, with 9 G (0,1) and for simplicity, it is constant 
over time. In period 1, before another firm requires certification, the true type of the 
firm certified in period 0 is revealed.
dealers and creditors can demand ’’ratings triggers” in financial contracts in order to accelerate 
repayment of an outstanding loan or to secure collateral if the borrower’s rating falls below a certain 
level.
4Given that the fees are paid upfront, this assumption is necessary to make sure the firm is has 
enough resources to pay the intermediary’s fees.
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2 .2 .2  In term ed iary ’s P r iv a te  S ignals
At time t , with t e  {0 ,1}, the certification intermediary receives a request for an 
assessment. She cannot a priori distinguish between Good and Bad firms but by 
conducting an evaluation of the firm she receives additional noisy information. The 
intermediary can be of two types: Talented (T) and Untalented (U). A talented 
intermediary identifies the project’s type with probability 1 (a.s.), while if untalented 
(U) she only observes a noisy signal about the project. The certification intermediary 
knows her own type but investors and firms are uncertain about the intermediary’s 
ability denoted by a, where a = {T, U}, and must learn about it over time. The 
intermediary’s private information is given by 5/, where sq is a signal indicating a 
Good project and sB is a signal indicating a Bad project (the time subscript is omitted 
in order to simplify the notation). It is assumed that if the intermediary is talented, 
which at date 0 occurs with probability ao, with ao G (0, 1), then:
If untalented, which at date 0 occurs with probability 1 — cco, the signal-generation 
process is given by:
Pr (sq \G ,T )  = Pr (sB \ B ,T )  = 1,
and
Pr (sq \ B ,T )  = P r (sB \ G ,T ) = 0. (2.1)
P r(s G | G,U) =  P r (s B I B ,U )  =  1 - s
and
Pr (so \B ,U )  = P r (sb \G ,U ) = e, (2 .2)
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where e G (0, | )  and is com m on knowledge.
After observing the private signal the certification intermediary uses Bayes’ rule 
to revise her estimate that the project is good. Thus, an intermediary forms her 
posterior belief using the prior about the project’s type and (2.1) or (2.2) depending 
on her type, according to
Pr (G | sg , T )  = 1, Pr (G \ sB, T) =  0 (2.3)
and
P. (C | W. ■>) -  , P , (O I V) -  +  (1 (1 _  e y  (2.4)
Certification intermediaries charge a fee determined endogenously and paid up­
front, like common practice with rating agencies. Before evaluating the firm the 
intermediary is at the same informational level as any potential investor of the firm, 
i.e. she cannot ex-ante distinguish between the two projects.
Investors value certified firms based on the intermediary’s report, the belief they 
have that her report is correct, and the other variables that are common knowledge. 
At the end of the period the state of nature is realised and publicly observed. In­
vestors have then the chance to update their beliefs about the intermediary’s type, 
by comparing the message sent with the true state in case the project is undertaken. 
The game is then repeated for one more period with the same intermediary and in­
vestors but with a new firm. This concludes the game. Reputation in this context 
translates the beliefs of investors about the certification intermediary ability, given 
the message that she sent and the true project’s type or the investor’s initial belief
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about the project’s true type in case this is not undertaken.
2 .2 .3  In vestors
At each date, the investors’ required repayment to invest in certified debt is derived 
after a message has been sent by the certification intermediary. The required repay­
ment at time t depends on the true type, on the intermediary’s message, and on the 
confidence investors have in her message, as captured by her reputation a t . This mes­
sage is given by my, where f  e  {G ,B }, m o  corresponds to a favourable report and m B 
to an unfavourable report (again the time subscript is omitted in order to simplify the 
notation). The required repayment at time t, for a message rrif and provided that the 
firm is of type f, is denoted by ryy, with ryy € [§, l] • Using Bayes’ rule to evaluate the 
various conditional probabilities and given that the financial market is competitive 
and risk neutral, ryy needs to satisfy the investors participation constraints for each
TTlf'.
Pr (G | m f , {fi,}) r)a + Pr (B  \ m } , {fl,}) r)B =  ^
where {f^} represents the investors’ information set at time t.
Whenever the project is undertaken and fails the liquidation value is zero meaning 
that TqB = TgB =  0. Additionally, in order to simplify the model and focus on the 
most interesting case it is assumed that investors cannot become involved in a project
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whose report has been unfavourable5. As a result, Vqq is derived to be equal to
1
2
Furthermore, Tqq needs to be lower than 1 to make sure that firms would like to 
undertake the project. Hence,
L em m a 1. A necessary condition for investment to happen is
For a given prior belief, the intermediary message needs to be informative. The 
remainder of this chapter considers that investment only takes place if a favourable 
report is issued, provided that (2.5) holds.
2 .2 .4  T h e C ertification  In term ed iary  Fee
The objective of the certification intermediary is to maximise the expected value of 
her future profits (fee net of any certification costs). The fee is derived as follows. 
The firm’s manager acts on behalf of the shareholders and knows the project’s type 
but enjoys private benefit of control. Hence, he is willing to pay any fee to undertake 
the project and not to reveal the true type in the Bad-project’s case. In particular, 
the manager of Bad project is willing to pay as much as the manager of a Good 
project. Because certification is compulsory, at time t a Good firm is willing to pay
a fee Ft (a t) up to the amount for which its participation constraint is binding. A
5This can be an equilibrium condition for certain values of the parameters. But otherwise it can 
be justified by institutional reasons; for example pensions funds and insurance companies are not 
allowed to invest in securities rated with a non-investment grade. For other examples see supra note
Pr (G) P r (mG | G, {fi,}) >  Pr (B) P r (mG \ B, {ft(} ) . (2.5)
3.
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higher fee cannot be extracted from Good firms as shareholders would veto it. The 
surplus for a good message is 1 — rGG — Ft (at) and for a bad message —Ft (a t) . Thus, 
the Good firm’s participation constraint at t is the following:
Pr (mG | G, (1 -  r'oc -  Ft (at)) +  Pr (mB | G, {fit}) ( - F t (a,)) =  0.
Looking at the firm participation constraint, two conflicting interests can be iden­
tified for the firm (and indirectly for the intermediary): the firm wants the repayment 
to investors to be as low as possible, and this happens if a more reputable interme­
diary sends a good message but, on the other hand, a less reputable intermediary is 
more likely to send a good message necessary for the project to be undertaken.
Given rGG, the fee at time t, Ft (a t) can be set up to
Pr (G) Pr (mG | G, {fit}) -  Pr (B) Pr (m a \ B , {fit»  
----------------------------- m ( G ) ------------------------------' (2'6)
By Lemma 1, this is always positive.
However, for the firm no certification means no project but for the intermediary 
no certification also means no fee. Both parties have something to lose if the project 
is not undertaken and this implies that the intermediary might not extract the full 
surplus of certification from the firm. Hence, the certification intermediary knows 
she can charge a fraction k , with n e  (0, 1], can be thought of as the outcome of 
bargaining, exogenous to the model, between the intermediary and the firm.
To sum up, the fee charged by the certification intermediary is unique. According 
to what happens in reality, it is not possible for the certification intermediary to
screen among firms by offering a menu of fees {Ft (a*)} and let each firm choose a fee
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according to its type. This would mean that by choosing a fee the firm would reveal its 
type and there would be no need for the firm to be assessed and for the intermediary 
to worry about reputation. The Bad-firm has a monetary surplus associated to the 
project that equals zero but its manager is ready to pay as much as the Good-firm is 
paying, in order not to reveal its type, at the expense of the existing holders of the 
firm6. Basically, in this model the firm has a passive role. Certification is compulsory, 
therefore the firm only chooses whether to obtain certification and indirectly whether 
to undertake the project.
It is also assumed that the firm cannot refuse to make use of the information 
collected by the intermediary after learning the evaluation that she will report to 
investors.
2 .2 .5  T h e C ertifica tion  In term ed iary  B eh av iou r
After being hired, the certification intermediary collects information about the firm 
in the form of the private signal Sf. She then balances out the costs and benefits of 
sending a report that is contrary to the private signal, i.e. she chooses P r (mo \ Sb ) and 
Pr (m s  | sq) • In order to ease notation the time subscript is omitted and henceforth 
Pr(ra<3 | s b ) is denoted by 7 and Pr(rajg | sq) by 7 . There is however an arbitrarily 
small cost from deviating from the private signal given by c* that includes, for example, 
the cost in terms of extra time and effort of commissioning a report where a financial 
analyst has to disguise private information about the firm7. This cost ensures that
6Remember that the manager will be unemployed unless the project is undertaken.
7It can also include litigation costs, i.e. ct can be interpreted as the legal cost in case misreporting 
is discovered times the probability of legal action. Even though legal action is relatively common 
for auditing firms, lawsuits against rating agencies seem to be quite infrequent. There have however 
been some cases where rating agencies have been accused of fraud in misreporting or omitting certain 
facts in their ratings (e.g. the Jefferson County, Colorado, School District case against Moody’s, the 
Orange County, California case against S&:P or the LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Duff&Phelps Co. case).
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the intermediary has incentives to care about reputation even in the last period of 
the game.
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
In a first best world, an intermediary should simply report her private signal. In 
a world with reputational concerns and where a certification intermediary seeks to 
maximise expected profits, an equilibrium consists of choices by the intermediary of 7 
and 7 specifying the probability of sending a message different from the signal received. 
It also consists of choices by the firm of whether to hire or not the certification 
intermediary (and indirectly whether to undertake the new project) based on a t , 7 
and 7 and a system of beliefs formed by investors. Investors choose whether to provide 
investment funds and the expected repayment based on 9, a t, 7 and 7 . The model is 
solved by backwards induction.
2.3 .1  P er iod  1
C ertifica tio n  In te rm e d ia ry  O p tim a l B eh av io u r an d  Fee
In period 1, since deviating from the private signal is costly and there is no reputa­
tional benefit to consider (as the game is over at the end of period 1), the certification 
intermediary minimises costs by always reporting her signal. Therefore,
P ro p o sitio n  1. The certification intermediary never misreports in the last period, 
regardless of her type.
In addition, agencies have also been investigated by the SEC and the US Department of Justice.
Alternatively, it can been seen as a short-cut to capture in a two period model the impact over 
the future reputation which would happen in repeated relationships.
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Given Proposition 1, probabilities P r(ra<3 | G, { ^ 1}) and P r(ra<3 | i?, {Qi}) are 
equal to a\ +  (1 — cq) (1 — e) and (1 — ol\) e respectively. And using (2.6) the fee 
charged in period 1 is
A higher reputational level of the certification intermediary generates a higher fee
maximise o l \ .  When investors are unsure about the intermediary’s type they require 
a higher repayment because they want to be compensated for the probability of an 
untalented intermediary making a mistake by sending a favourable report for a bad 
project. In addition to bearing a higher repayment good firms are also uncertain 
about which message the intermediary is going to send. As a result a lower fee is 
derived from the firm’s participation constraint.
Posterior beliefs
So far reputation in period 1 has been generally denoted by a \ but in fact it varies 
depending on the message sent and how it relates to the outcome of the project. 
Therefore, henceforth aoG denotes the posterior belief that the certification interme­
diary is talented given that she sent m o  and the true firm’s type was indeed G, i.e. 
to denote Pr(T  | mo, G); aoB is used to identify the probability that the certification 
intermediary is talented given that she sent m o  but the true type turned out to be 
B, i.e. P r(T  | ra^, J3); and finally, ct}3 denotes the posterior belief that the certifica­
tion intermediary is talented given that she sent m#, i.e. P r(T  | m s)  • In this case 
the project is not undertaken and therefore investors and the new firm cannot com­
pare the certification intermediary’s report to the project realisation. The analytical
(2.7)
as 9Fq^  is positive. As a result, when hired in period 0, the intermediary acts to
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expressions for these probabilities are derived below.
2 .3 .2  P er iod  0
Certification Intermediary Optimal Behaviour
At date 0, a certification intermediary is hired, paid Fo (oo) and collects a private 
signal about the project. After observing the signal, the intermediary comes up with 
a posterior belief about the value of the project and must make a decision about what 
message to send. She makes this decision such that her expected fee in period 1, 
that depends on her reputational level at the end of period 0, is maximised. The link 
between periods 0 and 1 is therefore the intermediary’s reputation, which is revised 
at the end of period 0 in view of whether her forecast was realised or not.
After observing the private signal the certification intermediary uses the Bayes’ 
rule to revise her estimate about the project’s type according to (2.3) and (2.4). A 
certification intermediary with ability a and a private signal sG has an expected profit 
from reporting her signals of:
Pr (G | sG, a) Fi {aGG) +  P r (B  \ sG, a) (aGB) -
But it may be that she decides to send a message different from her private signal even 
though this implies an extra cost of Co. In this case, the expected profit in period 1 
is Fi (as) — Co- The intermediary sends the message that generates a higher expected 
profit in period 1. Looking at the following expression:
7re (a) =  Pr (G | sG, a) F1 (aGG) +  P r (B \ sG, a) F1 (aGB) -  Fi (aB) + cq, (2.8)
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in equilibrium, if 7re (a) >  (<) o the intermediary follows (contradicts) the private 
signal and if n f (a) =  0 there is an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
On the other hand, if the private signal indicates that the project is bad and the 
message coincides with this private signal, the expected profit in period 1 is simply 
Fi (aB) , but if the certification intermediary decides to go against her private signal 
the expected profit is
Pr ( G \ sb , a) Fi («olgg) + P r(B  \ s B, a) (a GB) -  Cq.
Once more the intermediary looks at
IF (a) = Pr (G \ sB, a) Fi (a GG) +  Pr (B  \ sB, a) Fi (aGn) - c o - F i  (a B). (2.9)
There is no deviation from the private signal for tF  (a) < 0 and there is an equilibrium 
in mixed strategies if 7F  (a) =  0. Otherwise, the intermediary contradicts the private 
signal.
It can also be proven that the talented certification intermediary never misreports. 
In particular, there cannot be an equilibrium in which the talented certification in­
termediary always sends a message that goes against her private signal. Looking 
at pure strategies only, observe that a talented intermediary always has less of an 
incentive to misreport than the untalented one. So if an intermediary observes sq 
and reports m B the expected profit is F\ (aB) — cq regardless of the type. But 
when a talented intermediary observes sB and reports m o  her expected profit is 
Fi {&g b) ~  Co which is lower than the expected profit an untalented intermediary, 
P r (G | sB, a) Fi (&gg) + P r  (B  \ sB, a) Fi («gb) — cq as the fee is increasing in the rep­
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utational level and the reputational level increases when the intermediary is correct 
and decreases otherwise i.e., acG exceeds olqb- Consequently, an untalented inter­
mediary misreports whenever a talented intermediary does so. Secondly, it can be 
proven by contradiction that a talented intermediary never misreports. If for signal 
sq the talented certification intermediary sends m s, then the untalented certification 
agent would also choose to send m s- The firm then decides not to hire an intermedi­
ary because certification is costly and an unfavourable report implies no investment. 
And if whenever the signal is sb the talented certification intermediary sends mo, the 
untalented certification intermediary would also chooses to send mo- If the talented 
intermediary decides to deviate and be truthful, the untalented might or might not 
deviate from mo- If she does not, the talented intermediary prefers being truthful 
because when sending m s  she reveals her type whereas before investors could not dis­
tinguish between the two types. In fact, if both types behaved alike investors would 
be unable to update their prior belief about the intermediary’s type. This would lead 
to a lower reputational level and consequently to a lower fee. Hence, if the untalented 
type does not follow the talented type deviation, she always prefers to deviate. If 
she also sends the true signal mg, then the talented intermediary reconsiders what to 
do: she can either keep sending m s  or not. But if not the untalented type will again 
follow because as it was stated in the beginning of this proof a talented intermediary 
always has less of an incentive to misreport than the untalented one, so if she misre­
ports the other does it as well. And in such case, it is better to be truthful. Hence, 
in equilibrium the talented intermediary reports her private signal.
This also does not mean that the talented certification intermediary follows a 
mixed strategy in equilibrium. In this case if a signal Sq is received, the talented 
certification intermediary is indifferent between sending txig and m s  and therefore
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randomises between the two, i.e. 7re (T) =  0. As a result, the untalented certification 
intermediary strictly prefers to send as i e (U) <  0. This follows from the fact 
that the noisy private signal makes sending m o  strictly worse for the untalented in­
termediary than for the talented one (sending ra# gives both types the same profit;
i.e. Fi (a#) — Co and Fi (ogg) exceeds F\ (aci3)). Hence, every time the talented in­
termediary chooses to randomise, the untalented intermediary strictly prefers to send 
771b. This implies that only the talented certification intermediary ever sends m o  and 
as a result, a favourable report allows firms and investors to identify the intermedi­
ary’s type with certainty. Consequently, when this happens she is able to extract the 
maximum fee in period 1. But this also contradicts the conjectured indifference of the 
talented certification intermediary between sending m o  and m s- Thus, in equilibrium 
the talented certification intermediary cannot play a mixed strategy. A similar proof 
holds when the private signal is s b - However in this case, the talented certification 
intermediary is the only one sending m s qstF(U ) > 0.
As far as the untalented intermediary is concerned, a mixed strategy independent 
of 6 cannot be an equilibrium. This can be proven by contradiction. If there is a mixed 
strategy such as IF (U) = 0 this implies that ne (U) >  0 because Fi (ogg) is higher 
than Fi (olgb) and P r (6? | sq ,U) exceeds P r(G  | s b ,U )8. This means that there is 
set of priors that makes the untalented intermediary indifferent between reporting 
favourably or unfavourably when she receives a bad private signal but that makes her 
report the private signal when this is positive. A similar result holds for 7re (U) — 0. 
Therefore, it is obvious that the certification intermediary’s optimal behaviour is 
going to be affected by the prior 6. In fact, it can be proven that the equilibrium is 
characterised by two values of 0, given by 6l and Oh , with 0 < 6l < Oh < 1, such that
8And hence 7re (U) — ife (U) is always positive.
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for 9 < 6i  the untalented certification intermediary reports %  when the signal is sb 
but plays a mixed strategy if the private signal is Sq] on the other hand, for 6 > 6h 
the untalented certification intermediary reports m e  when the signal is sg but plays 
a mixed strategy when the private signal if s b • For the remaining set of priors, i.e. 
Ol < 9 < $h , the intermediary reports her private signal. It is then proved that this 
is indeed the unique equilibrium.
In order to prove this, the way reputation evolves between date 0 and 1 needs to be 
examined. If 9 < 9B it is above conjectured that a talented certification intermediary 
always reports her signal, whereas an untalented certification intermediary is expected 
to report ra# if s# is observed but plays a mixed strategy if sq is observed, i.e. reports 
tub with probability 7 and m o  with probability 1—7 . If m s  is sent, the posterior 
assessment of her ability is given by
 ___________________________Qp (1 -  9)__________________________
(1 — 9) +  (1 — o?o) (((1 ~  £) 9 +  £ (1 — 9)) 7 +  (e9 +  (1 — s) (1 — 0)))
(2.10)
And if the certification intermediary reports mo, her date 1 reputation varies depend­
ing on whether the project pays off 1 or 0. These two reputational levels are given 
by
— G G  ~  T 7 i  Wi W i V (2-11)ao + ( l - a 0) ( l - e ) ( l - 7 )
and Oqb — 0 respectively. Moreover, OqB < a B < ®gg and Qgg > but a B
only exceeds 00 when the prior belief 9 is relatively low and definitely lower than
Obviously investors need to be very convinced about the bad quality of the project
to be confident about an intermediary’s judgement that is not verifiable.
For projects whose 9 exceeds 9B , the talented certification intermediary reports her
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signal, whereas the untalented certification intermediary is conjectured to always send 
m o  when sq is observed, but sends m o  with probability 7 and m B with probability 
1 — 7 if sb is observed. When is sent, the posterior assessment of her ability is
-   «o (! -  0)__________  / ,  191
B a0( i - e )  + { i - a 0)(se + { i - s ) ( i - e ) ) ( i - ^ y  ( 1
And if the certification intermediary sends m o  her reputation is
®GG = — ZTi-VTTi \ 1 - \  (2.13)a Q +  (1 -  a 0) ((1 -  e)  +  £7 )
or aoB = 0, depending on whether the project pays off 1 or 0 respectively. In this 
case a o G  exceeds a B if e > ^ m -  However, this is always the case because if 6 is 
lower than that threshold, 7 equals zero for any Co . But it is also the case there is no 
6 compatible with such a 7 . Also, olgg > and a s  > <ao if <9 is relatively low and 
always happens for 6 lower than In addition, a B is always lower than a B and q ^ g  
is always higher than 'olgg-
The final step of the proof, i.e. to show that the mixed strategies (7 ,1 — 7 ) and
(7,1 — 7) do in fact exist, is relegated to the Appendix. The results can be generalised
by Proposition 2:
Proposition 2. The behaviour of the certification intermediary in period 0 is such 
that:
1. A talented certification intermediary always reports her signal This means that 
she reports m e  whenever sg is observed, and reports m s  whenever sB is ob­
served.
2. For the untalented certification intermediary, there are Ol and Oh , with Ol >
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such that, for 0 E (6l ,@h ), she always reports her signal i f  cq is arbitrarily 
small. Otherwise, and provided that the same condition on Cq is satisfied, the 
certification intermediary behaves as follows:
• For 6 equal to Ol she reports m s  whenever sb is observed, tind reports m s  
with probability 7 and m o with probability 1 — 7 whenever sq is observed 
and for 0 E [0, 6l ) she always sends a bad report;
• For 0 equal to Oh , she reports m o whenever sq is observed, and reports mo  
with probability 7 and m s  with probability 1 — 7 whenever sb is observed 
and for 0 E {Oh , 1] she always sends a good report.
This proposition establishes that an untalented intermediary may ignore her pri­
vate signal and decide instead to send a report that fits the expectations created by 
the public signal. This result is directly related to the issue of conformity. A number 
of papers such as Bernheim (1994) and Prendergast (1993) discuss this topic. By 
behaving in this particular way, an agent is basically trying to differentiate himself 
from the type that he wishes not to be identified with. The goal of the untalented 
intermediary is to mimic the talented type as by doing so she diminishes the chances 
of revealing her type. If for example 0 is sufficiently low, there is a relatively high 
probability that the talented intermediary has received a bad signal and that she will 
send an unfavourable report. Given that the untalented intermediary cannot trust 
completely her private signal, there is a critical level of 0, such that she chooses to 
ignore it with positive probability if it indicates that the firm is good.
On the other hand, it was proven in the Appendix that the threshold Ol is higher 
than | .  For medium values of the prior belief about the project quality, i.e when 
the prior is less informative, one would expect the untalented intermediary to report
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truthfully but in fact, she chooses to report ra# even when this contradicts her pri­
vate information, i.e. there is an excessive number of bad reports. This happens 
because there is an asymmetry of observability in the model: a project issued with an 
unfavourable report is not undertaken and this limits the learning process about the 
certification intermediary’s type, which makes sending unfavourable reports a safer 
option.
C o m p ara tiv e  S ta tic s
A number of interesting results are derived when performing comparative statics in 
the equilibrium values of 7 and 7 .
P ro p o s itio n  3. The equilibrium probabilities 7 and 7 are monotonic in 0 and greatest 
for extremely high and low values of 0, i.e. | |  > 0 for 0 € (Oh , 1) , and < 0 for 
0 € (0, Ol ) , with 7 \e=eH= 0 and 7 \$=eL= 0.
This means that the more extreme the prior belief 0 is, the higher the probability of 
deviation from the private signal. The lower the prior belief, the higher the probability 
of sending an unfavourable report when facing a good private signal. On the contrary, 
the higher the prior belief, the higher the probability of sending a favourable report 
when facing a bad private signal. If the public signal is uninformative, i.e. 0 = 
an untalented intermediary can either be truthful or conservative, i.e. always reports 
an unfavourable private signal but reports a favourable private signal with a positive
probability only, depending on the reputational level.
P ro p o s itio n  4. The equilibrium probabilities 7 and 7 are monotonic and increasing
in e, i.e. ^  > 0 and |=  > 0.
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This is an intuitive result: the less talented an intermediary is, the less she trusts 
her private signal and the higher the incentive to ignore it and convey with the public 
information.
P ro p o s itio n  5. The equilibrium probability 7 is concave and decreasing in ao for  
sufficiently small levels of c q .
As reputation increases, the intermediary’s difference in future profits from sending 
the two different messages becomes lower, i.e. is negative. For high levels of 9, 
the higher the initial reputational level 00 the lower the increase in reputation if a 
favourable report is correct, and the higher the decrease in reputation if it turns out 
to be wrong. Hence, the more reputable an intermediary is the less incentives she has 
for gambling by deviating from an unfavourable private signal that has the advantage 
of generating a non-random level of future profits.
P ro p o s itio n  6 . The equilibrium probability 7 is always increasing and convex in a 0-
The same reasoning as before applies here. Reporting a favourable private signal 
increases reputation and future profits if the report turns out to be right but if it 
turns out to be wrong the intermediary’s type is revealed and this generates a high 
cost in terms of profits next period. Thus because the benefit from deviating is not 
certain, an intermediary tends to deviate from her private information and send an 
unfavourable report instead as this turns out to be less risky. As reputation increases, 
the intermediary’s difference in future profits from sending the two different messages
o_e
becomes lower, i.e. ^  is negative. This means that the higher the reputational level 
the lower the benefits from reporting the private signal and hence, the stronger the 
incentives to deviate.
This leads to the following corollary:
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C o ro lla ry  1. The behaviour of the untalented certification intermediary is such that 
as her reputational level increases, she tends to issue unfavourable reports more often 
than favourable ones.
The asymmetry of observability arising from the fact that a good report is always 
verifiable whereas a bad one is not, combined with the fact that a more reputable 
intermediary benefits less from gambling, results in a more reputable intermediary 
being more prone to sending unfavourable reports when the prior is relatively low or 
relatively high than a less reputable one9.
This result is in line with some empirical evidence that suggests that smaller 
agencies, which are usually regarded as less reputable by investors and firms, tend to 
rate in a more favourable way. For instance, Cantor and Packer (1997) reveal that, 
in their sample, DCR and Fitch give systematically higher ratings on jointly rated 
issues than Moody’s and S&P. They test whether this fact reflects different rating 
scales or results from selection bias, i.e. only higher-rated firms seek DCR and Fitch 
ratings. They found limited evidence of selection bias and concluded that observed 
differences in average ratings seem to reflect differences in rating scales and standards. 
Also Jewell and Livingston (2000) find that DCR ratings axe higher than S&P’s or 
Moody’s.
Fees an d  Investo rs
The behaviour described above constitutes the only credible behaviour from the in­
termediary point of view. And this is going to be useful in period 0 when investors
price debt and the firm makes its hiring decision and decides on the fee. Thus, for 9 €
9Conservatism is also discussed by Zwiebel (1995). The idea is that reputational concerns may 
lead managers to refrain from undertaking innovations that are first order stochastically dominant 
because of the downside risk of being fired.
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[ O l ,  O h ]  the conditional probabilities, repayment to investors and fee remain the same 
as in period 1 because intermediaries are truthful. If 0 e  [0 , 6 l ) ,  pr (mG \ G , {f^o}) =  
a0 +  (1 -  a 0) (1 -  e) ( l -  7) and pr(m G | B, {Q0}) =  (1 -  a 0) £ ( l -  7) .  And using 
(2.6) the fee charged in period 0 is
a oe +  ( 0 - e ) - ( l - a o) ' y ( 0 - e )
Fo (a0) =  « -------------------- Ye---------=----------•
There are two effects that need to be considered in this case. The firm knows that 
an intermediary is likely to conform to the public information and that a favourable 
report is less likely to occur. This has a negative effect on the fee. On the other hand, 
when the report is indeed favourable, the intermediary is choosing to contradict the 
public signal so investors believe the intermediary is more likely to be telling the 
tru th  but only if the probability that she is making a mistake is not very high, i.e. 
e < 6. The required repayment to investors is lower and the intermediary can extract 
a higher fee than if there had not been deviation from the private signal, i.e. 7 =  0. 
The lower the difference between 0 and e, i.e. the higher the prior belief 6 or the lower 
the e, the lower the repayment to investors and the higher the fee. If on, the other 
hand, 6 decreases and e increases, investors tend to attribute a favourable message 
to an honest mistake. They require a higher compensation for this extra risk and 
consequently the fee is going to be lower.
Finally, if 0 G (Oh , 1],
P r (mG | G, {ft0}) =  a 0 +  (1 -  a 0) (1 -  e +  £7 )
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and
Pr (mG | B , {Qq}) = (1 -  a 0) (^ +  (1 -  e) 7 ) •
It follows that the fee in period 0 is
, . ao£ +  (0 — e) +  (1 — ao) 7 (0 +  e — 1)
-ro (Q!oJ -  k----------------------- —------------------------.
If 9 exceeds 1 — e the fee is higher than if the intermediary had followed the private 
signal, i.e. 7 =  0. The same logic applies here. As the intermediary is more likely 
to conform with the (good) public information, the firm and investors can expect 
a favourable report more frequently. But it turns out that 6h is always higher than 
1—£10, hence deviations from the private signal only happen when 6 is very high or the 
probability of making a mistake e is very low. Therefore, investors are more likely to 
believe that a favourable report does translate the intermediary private information. 
They require a lower repayment and the surplus that the firm is going to share with 
the intermediary is higher.
2.4 Bertrand Com petition
So far the focus of this chapter has been on the strategic information revelation of a 
monopolistic certification intermediary. However, it is common to observe in many 
markets intermediaries competing among each other. In the credit rating industry this 
trend is very likely to increase in the future given the likely increase in the demand for 
ratings for regulatory purposes. To reflect this situation consider again the framework
10See Proof of Proposition 2 (part (i) Type Ug randomises for high values of 9) in the Appendix.
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developed in Section 2.2 and introduce a second certification intermediary11. Thus 
at each date the existing certification intermediary i faces potential competition of 
an incoming certification intermediary j. The incoming competitor has entry costs 
of zero and to simplify the analysis and limit the number of cases to consider they 
only differ in terms of the initial reputation, i.e. c^o 7^  &j012 and ajo is positive. At 
each date, intermediaries make simultaneous offers and the firm accepts or refuses the 
proposals simultaneously.
The repayment to investors is calculated as before but that is not the case for the 
fee paid by the firm. At each date, the firm’s expected surplus from being certified 
by intermediary 0 with (f> = i , j  is
Pr (mG | G , {Qt} ,</>)(!- r#  (m G, G)) -  F# (ait, a jt) .
2 .4 .1  P er io d  1
C ertifica tio n  In te rm ed ia ry  O p tim a l B ehav iou r an d  Fee
In this period no one misreports because this implies an additional cost that is not 
matched by an additional benefit. Thus,
P ro p o s itio n  7. With competition, a certification intermediary continues reporting 
her private signal in the last period.
Intermediaries make offers to the firm regarding the fee to be charged for certifi-
11 Most companies are rated by more than one rating agency. Therefore this can be reinterpreted 
as a firm seeking for an additional rating that is going to be attributed by one of the remaining 
rating agencies. For example, according to Jewell and Livingston (1999 and 2000), show that the 
DCR and Fitch rating serves as a tie-break in case of split ratings between Moody’s and S&P.
12You can think of a situation where there is a pool of analysts whose ability is fixed: it can either 
be 1 or 1 — e but the entity that hires them might (or might not) be able to distinguish between the 
two types of analysts with probability cuo (1 — am).
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cation and this process simply results in the certification intermediary that generates 
the highest expected surplus setting the price by forcing the other intermediary to set 
a zero fee. Using the result derived in Proposition 7 and assuming that i generates 
the highest expected surplus for the firm, and is consequently hired, the fee charged 
in period 1 is
P r(m G | ,i) (1 -  rit (m G,G )) -F it (aiu ajt) = P r (mG | J )  (1 - r jt (raG, G))
or
/ - !  /  v  (oLi\£ . { 0 - e ) \  { Qijie ( 0 - e ) \
Fa (an, M  )
that simplifies to
Fn (aiuat j t )  =  ^  (a« -  a , i ) . (2.14)
After setting a fee such that the fee of the competitor is driven to zero, the firm still 
has the option not to undertake the project. Therefore, the surplus is divided between 
the firm and the intermediary according to their bargaining power resulting in the 
intermediary charging a proportion k of Fn. Of course, certification intermediary i 
is hired because an > <x,i (initial assumption). In addition, the fee charged now is 
lower than in the monopolistic case, i.e. Fn (c^i, aiji) <  Fi (ai) when an  =  aq, as the 
fee is now the difference between the expected surplus generated by certification by i 
minus the surplus generated if j  had been hired by the firm in proportion k .
Negative fees are ruled out in this model, however if this was not the case the results 
about the fee in period one would not change. If fees could in fact be negative, the 
intermediary that is not hired in period 0, which is the one with the lowest reputational 
level, would be willing to pay to have the chance to certify the firm in this period
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hoping to recover this amount in period one by being hired again. Of course this 
would only happen if in period one her new reputational level would be higher than 
her competitor’s, at least in some situations, and consequently, the firm would prefer 
to hire her instead i.e., if there were chances to recover the negative fee by charging 
a positive fee in the last period. The competitor, on the other hand, would never set 
negative fees in the last period as there are no future periods when to recover this 
’’investment” . Hence, in period one the intermediary with the highest reputational 
level would extract as much as possible from the firm. But then the intermediary with 
the highest reputational level would also be willing to pay to certify in period zero and 
given that she has more to lose13, she would be willing to pay even more, and up to the 
expected profit in period one and she would end up being hired in period zero. At this 
point she decides whether to misreport by looking at the expected profit in period one. 
She would try  to extract as much as possible from the firm in the cases where she is the 
intermediary with the highest reputational level14 given that her competitor would 
have no incentives to set negative fees. Hence, in period one intermediaries would 
always behave according to the differentiated Bertrand competition set-up described 
above.
Moreover, one could say that because there is competition k could perhaps be lower 
than in the monopolistic case. But once negative fees are ruled out, one intermediary 
sets the fee such that the competitor is out of the market even when she sets a zero- 
fee, i.e. even if all the surplus goes to the firm. So the intermediary with the highest 
reputational level charges a positive fee that generates at least the same surplus for the 
firm than the competitor is able to generate with a zero-fee. But even at this point,
13Remember that the fee increases with the reputational level.
14 And this will happen for sure at least for the case where she sends a good report in period zero 
that turns out to be correct.
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the firm has the option of not undertaking the project. Therefore, intermediary and 
firm can bargain on the fee that may decrease even further. But the intermediary 
that was already out of the market cannot interfere in this bargaining process, since 
she had already set the fees at the minimum possible level before.
Therefore, /t could in fact remain the same or not. In fact, since in competition 
the intermediary is bargaining over a lower surplus, it could even be the case that she 
bargains for a higher n to ensure a profit closer to monopoly but, for simplicity, it 
was assumed that /t remains the same.
Posterior Beliefs
The posterior beliefs about the certification intermediaries are calculated as before 
and to distinguish between both intermediaries a subscript i is added to the previous 
notation. The only difference relative to the previous case is that updating only occurs 
when an intermediary is hired. Otherwise, her reputational level remains equal to the 
prior. Also note that and a iB are higher than c^o for low levels of 0 and definitely 
if 0 <  1 i.e. sending an unfavourable report results in an increase in reputation only 
if investors expect the project to be bad, and is always higher than a iB. On 
the other hand, when they issue favourable reports that turn out to be incorrect the 
reputational level becomes 0 and increases relative to o^o if they are correct.
2 .4 .2  P er io d  0
Certification Intermediary Optimal Behaviour
Assume that i was hired in period 0 and therefore, = ctjo- The difference in 
expected profits (in period 1, from sending a favourable and an unfavourable report)
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when she receives sq is
2f1(a) =  P r (G | sa , a) Fn  (a^jg, a^o) + P r (B  \ sa ,a )F a (o£GB,a j0) - F u (a is , a ,0)+co.
(2.15)
and the difference in expected profits when she receives sb is
7rei (a) =  P r (G | sB,a) Ftl (z?CG, a j0)+ P r  (B | sB,a) Fa (a'CB,a j0) - F n  (a*B, a ,0)-Co-
(2.16)
Agent i is going to issue a favourable report (or play a mixed strategy) if 7rfl (a) 
and 7rei (a) are positive (or equal to zero). Otherwise she issues an unfavourable 
report. Following the same logic as before the following result can be stated:
P ro p o s itio n  8. With competition, the talented certification intermediary never mis- 
reports in period 0.
One of the main differences in relation to the previous Section is that now whenever 
an untalented intermediary is confronted with a realised project type that differs from 
the report issued, her reputation is driven down to zero and she is not going to be hired 
in the following period. This happens because if confronted with two intermediaries, 
one with a reputational level of djo and the other one with 0, the firm chooses the 
one with higher posterior about the ability. Therefore:
P ro p o s itio n  9. I f  investors and firms are sure a certification intermediary is untal­
ented, she is never hired independently of the reputational level of her competitor.
On the other hand, if an intermediary issues a correct good report her reputation 
increases, which means that given that she was hired in period 0, she is necessarily 
going to be hired in period 1. However, issuing a bad report is no longer a riskless
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strategy. For high values of 6, issuing a bad report worsens the intermediary’s reputa­
tion as the remaining agents believe she is making a mistake. This might or might not 
affect the intermediary’s possibilities of being hired in the following period depending 
on how close the initial reputations are.
Summing up, compared with the monopolistic case, the reputational cost of a 
mistake is now much higher and intermediaries face a considerably lower probability of 
being hired in the last period when a mistake is discovered. This first effect encourages 
truth-telling. But there is a second effect: the probability of being hired is determined 
by the first period announcement and a truthful report that cannot be verified might 
also affect the intermediary’s chances of being hired, which may in turn lead to less 
truth-telling. Hence, the crucial point is to study what happens when a bad report 
implies a decrease in reputation that might compromise future commitments. If not, 
the following proposition is derived:
P ro p o s itio n  10. Competition changes the set of prior beliefs about the quality of the 
project for which an untalented certification intermediary deviates from the private 
signal in period 0, when otj0 < a lB < o?B: she becomes more aggressive and issues 
favourable reports more frequently than in the monopolistic case.
P ro o f. In the Appendix. ■
In this case, the intermediary is always hired next period except when a good 
report is found to be incorrect. However, there is also a monetary effect to consider 
with competition: the fee is now lower by an amount equivalent to proportion k of 
the surplus of the competitor relative to the case without competition. But if the 
intermediary reports an incorrect report she is not going to hired next period and in 
this case the future payoff is simply zero. W ithout competition, the intermediary’s
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type would be revealed but, because the firm has no outside option, she would still 
be hired but receiving a fee in accordance to her type. So it turns out that the 
difference between the payoffs in this particular scenario is lower than proportion k of 
the surplus of the competitor and this makes the decrease in the expected fee relative 
to the case with no competition lower when a good report rather than a bad report 
is issued. Hence 7fet (U) > 7fe (U) and 7re* (U) > 7re (U) and reporting favourable 
messages becomes more frequent than before.
To sum up, the dominant effect in this case is the first one: a lower probability of 
being hired encourages truth-telling. Intermediaries still conform with public infor­
mation and ignore private signals when the prior about the quality of the project is 
extreme, but conservatism is attenuated.
For a low degree of differentiation, i.e. ajo > a iB and/or a^o > &iB-> competition 
becomes very aggressive and only when positive reports turn out to be correct the 
intermediary is hired in the following period. In fact, the intermediary no longer 
behaves conservatively and does not take into account the effect of the initial prior 
about the quality of the project when issuing her report. Thus,
P ro p o s itio n  11. When ajo > a iB > a iB, untalented certification intermediaries 
always issue favourable reports in period 0.
The second effect is now the dominant one: in order to maximise the probability 
of being hired in the future the intermediary compromises truth-telling and in the 
limit only issues favourable reports regardless of her private information.
In the monopolistic case the asymmetry in payoffs observability make more rep­
utable intermediary more prone to sending unfavourable reports for relatively lower 
or relatively higher priors. A duopolistic structure in the certification industry mit­
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igates this result by introducing more symmetry between sending favourable and 
unfavourable reports. Sending unfavourable reports is now less beneficial and this 
affects any untalented intermediary regardless of her reputation.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies the behaviour of certification intermediaries, in particular it 
looks at their incentives to report a message that differs from their private signal in 
a framework where they value reputation. The model identifies a source of incentive 
conflicts for certification intermediaries. It finds that reputational concerns are not 
enough to prevent deviations from the private signal, in fact these concerns might end 
up being the driving force being them. Intermediaries that are sure of their signals 
always report truthfully but those that cannot trust their private signals may end 
up ignoring them and sending the report that investors and firms anticipated based 
on public information, in particular when the public signal is extreme, in an attem pt 
to avoid reputational costs. Despite its simplicity, the model can motivate several 
patterns of behaviour, in particular, this results provide a theoretical explanation for 
empirical findings that suggest that ratings agencies exhibit excess sensitivity to the 
business cycle and in some cases adjust their ratings after market participants have 
already adjusted their perceptions of creditworthiness.
In the monopolistic setting, the intermediaries with a higher reputation tend to 
be conservative when issuing their reports but competition forces them to be more 
aggressive in order to be hired in the following period.
This is relevant for policy-makers. Under proposed revisions to bank capital re­
quirements advanced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, banks using
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a standardised approach to calculating their minimum required capital will base such 
requirements, whenever possible, on the credit ratings assigned to the companies to 
which they lend. To the extent that rating agencies might behave pro-cyclically, bank 
capital requirements will tend to be higher during downturns, further reducing credit 
supply during downturns. In addition, the Basel proposal will increase the demand for 
ratings as will definitely have an impact on the market structure of the industry. The 
increasing importance of ratings agencies in financial market as a result of regulatory 
measures demands that these issues should be identified and tackled appropriately
56
Chapter 3
In Pursuit of H onesty in A uditing
The detection of fraud is the most important portion of the Auditor’s du­
ties, and there will be no disputing the contention that the Auditor who is 




In recent years many accounting irregularities have been left undetected for long 
periods of time and investors have not been timely warned about the implications 
of some activities that were being pursued by the firms they owned. An indication 
of this is the large number of times corporations restated their disclosed financial 
statements and how far back in time these restatements go. According to the U.S. 
General Accounting Office, there were 225 restatements in 2001 in the U.S. compared 
to 92 in 1997. Examples are Enron that made a restatement in the fall of 2001 of
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the net income back to 1997 that generated a $586 million reduction. More recently, 
Fannie Mae and AIG accounting mistakes that took place between 2001-2003 were 
only disclosed in 2005.
As a result of some of these accounting irregularities, most notably those related 
to Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act introduced a number of measures in an attem pt 
to strengthen investors confidence in auditors’ integrity and honesty. For instance, 
the Act established the introduction of an independent regulatory body tha t is in 
charge of supervising accounting firms and requires that partners of accounting com­
panies supervising the external audit have to rotate regularly as to undermine the 
development of personal relationships between the partner and his client.
Empirical evidence1 suggests that there is a connection between lack of auditor 
rotation or longer auditor tenures and financial restatements as unexpected auditor 
replacements tend to lead to restatements of a firm’s earnings. Also both Myers et 
al. (2004) and Choi and Doogar (2005) find that the likelihood of certain earnings 
misstatements (misstatements that increase earnings, misstatements for core earnings 
components and in quarterly financial reports) increases with auditor tenure. Basi­
cally, in a situation where auditors can make mistakes because for example, the firm’s 
accounting procedures are not transparent enough, if an auditor remains in the firm 
long enough she can simply delay the announcement of bad news about it in order 
to protect expected rents from a continued engagement with the firm. On the other 
hand, the fact that honest mistakes can be made gives the firm no way to distinguish 
between a genuine mistake or simple manipulation: even if shareholders suspect some­
thing is wrong with the firm and demand an extra audit that ends up proving their 
suspicions, the auditor can always argue against manipulation. However, keeping the
1See for example, Lazer et al. (2004).
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same auditor might also be advantageous for the firm as the longer an auditor stays 
with a firm the more familiar she becomes with the firm’s accounting procedures and 
activities and consequently, more efficient when looking for genuine mistakes.
Given this trade-off, it is important to study how rotating auditors affects the 
gathering and disclosure of information about the firm, in a context where audits are 
not perfect2 and auditors can enjoy private benefits and have limited liability.
In the model developed below, auditors are hired to validate the manager’s report 
about the financial accounts of a certain firm. This is necessary because management 
typically has an incentive to bias reports in its own favour. In particular, managers 
might derive private benefits of control and therefore be biased towards continuing 
projects and this creates a demand for confirmation of the financial reports that they 
provide. Thus, an audit can generate a good report (good news), implying that the 
project should continue, or a bad report (bad news) meaning that the project should 
be terminated. Auditors make a mistake when they incorrectly identify a bad project 
as a good one. As a result, a good audit report can be subject to a revision by either 
the same or a different auditor. The best example of such situation is the revision of 
quarterly financial statements during the annual audit.
In order to perform an audit the auditor needs to exert effort. Therefore, the 
objective of this chapter is to characterise the optimal contract between a firm’s 
shareholders and the firm’s auditor (or auditors) that overcomes the moral hazard 
problem that affects her (or them). In addition, the firm’s manager might try  to tempt 
the auditor (or one of them in case there is auditor rotation) to hide unfavourable 
reports by offering her private benefits such as access to other clients, or leisure 
related benefits like paid vacations, golf club memberships, etc., in case the project
2I.e., mistakes can be made.
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continues. As a result, the auditors’ actions can lead to report manipulation, which 
is translated into either the delay of the announcement of bad news or the lack of 
announcement of bad news and consequent inefficient continuation of the project. 
The former happens when the auditor continues auditing the firm and knows that she 
will have other opportunities to report about the real situation of the firm. The latter 
results from the existence of private benefits. Hence, the firm’s shareholders need to 
provide incentives for the auditor to report failure immediately rather than delaying 
its announcement as well as to adjust the transfer made to auditors for the existence 
of private benefits.
This chapter concludes that the optimal contract is such that auditors are re­
warded if and only if their reports are confirmed by facts and they tend to receive 
a higher reward (transfer) when they correctly contradict previous reports or make 
correct announcements that ex-ante appear less likely given what is publicly known 
about the quality of the project. Private benefits decrease the transfers made to au­
ditors for correct good reports but increase the transfers for correct bad reports as 
in this case the auditor foregoes the private benefit. If the private benefit exceeds 
a certain threshold, auditors extract extra rents because limited liability determines 
that transfers cannot be negative.
Familiarity with the firm due to repeated audits takes the form of a lower cost of 
effort to collect private information in the second audit. One interesting conclusion 
regarding this is that, even though transfers are paid to reward auditors for their 
effort and therefore one would expect them to decrease if the cost of effort decreases, 
this effect is limited. The intuition is the following. Shareholders need to reward 
the single auditor such that she collects and truthfully reports her private signal in 
both periods (when a report in the second period is needed). In addition, the auditor
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needs to be rewarded for the immediate announcement of correct bad news in the 
first audit in order to avoid manipulation. As a consequence, this transfer is going to 
be equal to the transfer for a correct bad report in the last period and both depend 
on the new cost of effort. Because sending correct bad reports in the first audit is so 
highly rewarded, sending two effortless consecutive good reports is going to be always 
dominated and the auditor is going to be indifferent between collecting and truthfully 
reporting information in both periods or in the last period only after having sent 
an initial good report. However, as the cost of effort for repeated audits decreases, 
collecting and revealing private information in both periods becomes increasingly 
preferred to behaving this way in the last period only3. And because the transfer for 
sending a correct bad report in the first audit depends on the new cost of effort it will 
also happen that this transfer is constantly decreasing and at some point sending two 
effortless good reports becomes a dominant strategy. Hence, in order to avoid this 
the transfer for a correct bad report in the first audit needs to increase and is going 
to be determined by the initial rather than by the new cost of effort: the firm needs 
to make the auditor exert the initial effort as once this has been done exerting effort 
in the second period is always preferred. The transfer for two correct good reports is 
also going to be independent of the new cost of effort as well as the expected transfer.
Shareholders’ initial opinion about the quality of the project determines whether 
the firm prefers rotating auditors or not when there is the need for confirmation of 
the first report. Not rotating is preferred if shareholders’ initial opinion about the 
project’s quality is higher than a certain threshold, i.e. in good times. In this case, 
the ’’more expensive” transfer for a correct bad report in the first audit4 is less likely
3For example, think of the case where the new cost of effort is simply equal to zero.
4”More expensive” in order to avoid manipulation as explained above.
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to be paid and auditors are instead more likely to be rewarded for correct good reports 
whose corresponding transfers are lower in the case of a single auditor. If familiarity 
with the firm generates savings in information collection, the threshold is lower than 
before but the existence of private benefits crowds out this positive effect.
Finally, audit regulation seems to be often seen as a substitute for corporate 
governance and accounting transparency. Better governance and more accounting 
transparency, that can be translated in the model for example, in terms of a lower 
probability of misidentification of failures when effort is exerted, would make auditing 
easier and cheaper and consequently, auditing regulation less necessary.
Information acquisition and transmission in principal-agent relationships have 
been widely studied. In Demski and Sappington’s (1987) the principal must choose 
from a range of available projects whose payoffs depend on an unknown state of the 
world. The risk-averse agent acquire a costly private signal about the state. They 
study the properties of optimal contracts for information acquisition and subsequent 
project selection in a series of examples and under fairly general information struc­
tures. More recently, a paper by Gromb and Martimort (2005) takes a setting with a 
simpler information structure and risk-neutral agents with limited liability and looks 
at the optimal organisation of expertise in a situation where experts advise on whether 
a firm should pursue a certain project. Depending on the experts’ reports, tha t can 
make symmetric mistakes when identifying a bad project as a good one and vice- 
versa, the project is undertaken or not. The model below differs from Gromb and 
Martimort (2005) as it considers sequential reporting in a situation where the out­
come is fully observable ex-post, regardless of the auditors’ report, auditors only make 
mistakes when they incorrectly identify bad projects, they can derive private benefits 
and there are savings in costs of information collection from repeated audits to the
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firm by the same auditor5. This is more in line with what happens in the auditing 
profession. For example, outcome observability is assumed because auditors certify 
the firm’s accounts that translate what has already been done on the firm and that it 
is going to be observable once the projects that the firm is undertaking are completed. 
And the motivation behind the assumption that auditors make asymmetric mistakes 
is the fact that managers often try  to disguise unfavourable information and hide it 
from shareholders but they rarely try  to hide favourable information. Hence, it is 
more likely that auditors fail to identify potential problems with the firm rather than 
miss to spot favourable developments.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on information acquisition and 
disclosure with multiple agents. Related papers are Krishna and Morgan (2001), 
Wolinsky (2002) and Hirao (1994). Krishna and Morgan (2001) extends Crawford and 
Sobel (1982) allowing for a decision-maker to sequentially consult two biased experts. 
Wolinsky (2002) also considers a problem in which experts have noisy information and 
their preferences differ significantly from those of the principal but he is interested in 
the optimal organisation of communication procedures among the experts. Kofman 
and Lawarree (1993) also looks at the case where there are multiple auditors. They 
derive the optimal contract when both an internal and external auditor are available 
but their focus is on the effect of collusion on the agent’s incentives to exert effort.
The issue of how private benefits affect the decision to whom to delegate a project- 
valuation task has been studied by Laux (2001). Private benefits in the model below 
are derived from sending a certain message, i.e. the auditor enjoys the benefit for sure 
if a certain message is sent, whereas in Laux it is outcome-related.
5 An older version of this paper, Gromb and Martimort (2003), does look at the case of sequential 
reporting but all the other differences between the two set-ups still hold even in this version.
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The model assumes limited liability however it also explores the impact of this 
assumption. This topic is also discussed in Dye (1993) which explicitly deals with 
the impact of legal liability on audit quality and the degree of care of auditors and 
Narayanan (1994) that looks at the effect of different liability rules.
This chapter is organised as follows. The model is outlined in the next section. 
Section 3.3 derives the optimal contract for a two auditor/two reports case and the 
following section compares it with the optimal contract for a one auditor/two reports 
case. Section 3.5 presents several extensions and policy implications and section 3.6 
concludes. Some proofs are in the Appendix.
3.2 The M odel
3.2 .1  S etu p
In this economy, there are two different classes of risk-neutral agents: two auditors 
(she) and a client-firm represented by a group of homogenous shareholders. The 
model lasts for two periods and the risk-free rate is zero. The firm is in the process 
of undertaking an investment project that is developed in two stages and the final 
outcome, which is the sum of the outcomes in both stages, is publicly observable in the 
last period6. In period 0 (today) shareholders have to decide whether to invest an extra 
I  to undertake the second stage or alternatively they can scale down the investment 
project and decide not to invest the extra funds. The firm’s shareholders (principal) 
own a productive technology but lack the ability or time necessary to supervise it
6For example, think about the decision of whether to increase the scale of the initial investment 
or of whether to invest in a complementary product.
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and must hire an auditor or auditors (agent) for that purpose7. Hence, shareholders 
require the services of an auditor (or auditors) and based on the information provided 
by her (them) they make the interim investment decision and decide to go ahead only 
if there is clear indication that the first stage was successful.
The firm’s shareholders want to minimise expected transfer costs of inducing acqui­
sition and revelation and the auditors, that have limited liability, want to maximise 
their income. As a result shareholders offer a contract that consists of a payment 
schedule for the auditors based on all jointly observed variables. It is assumed that 
shareholders can precommit to implementing the agreed-upon contract.
3 .2 .2  P ro jec t and In form ation  S tru ctu re
In the beginning of period 0, the first stage of the project has been completed. The 
outcome can be either a success S i with probability v or a failure S x with probability 
1 — v, and S_x =  —Si. The second stage is undertaken if investors provide the extra 
investment at the end of period 0. The outcome of this stage is S 2 or S_2 with 
probabilities u and 1 — u respectively if the first period outcome is £1 and probabilities 
1 — u and u respectively if S_x has been generated in the first period, with S_2 — —^ 2 
and u >
By exerting effort at a personal cost the auditor privately observes a signal 
a e  {&,&} about the project. Denote by 6 G ( | ,  l] the signal’s precision defined as 
P r  Gl I £.1) — 6 and P r (a \ S i) = 1. Hence, a is ’’good news” and a ’’bad news” 
about the project and mistakes arise from wrongly identifying a S_r  project as a 51- 
project. The signal a is assumed to be soft information, i.e., the auditor can fully
7Alternatively, assume that shareholders are small and dispersed and individual monitoring is 
very costly or even that auditing is compulsory.
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manipulate it when reporting to shareholders. The project’s outcome is verifiable in 
the long-run even when the second stage is not undertaken.
Note that the manager is a passive agent in this model and the focus is on the 
behaviour of auditors, however this information structure shows the incentives that 
managers might face: they might have preferences for ’’empire building” in the sense 
that they derive utility from overseeing large investment projects and hence might 
try  to hide failures but have no incentive to disguise successes. In addition, they can 
commit to provide one auditor with a private non-monetary, non-divisible and non- 
transferable benefit B  whenever the second stage of the project is undertaken. As a 
result, auditors’ interests are not perfectly aligned with those of the shareholders.
The private benefit enjoyed by the auditor is closely tied to the private benefits 
of control derived by the manager in case the project’s second stage is undertaken 
and this explains why the auditor’s private benefit is independent of the state of the 
world and depends solely on the continuation of the project. When both auditors are 
hired they are equally likely to receive private benefit B. This happens for a non- 
divisible private benefit and if the resources available to the manager for this purpose 
are limited. Consequently, he cannot credibly commit to provide a private benefit in 
excess of B. Example of such benefits are manager’s promises to introduce the auditor 
to a new client that is looking to hire one auditor or to involve one auditor in a new 
project that will only be undertaken in case of continuation. If the private benefit 
is in fact a promise to be fulfilled in the future, then it makes sense that when two 
auditors are hired by the firm they are equally likely to receive it since the promise 
is fulfilled after the shareholders’ decision to continue the project has been taken and 
ex-post the manager has no reason to prefer one auditor over the other.
It is assumed that shareholders prefer, whenever necessary, to receive two reports,
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the audits take place sequentially and only if both audits are ’’good news” the second 
stage of the project goes ahead. Note that in equilibrium, if effort is exerted and the 
report is g_ the project’s first stage has failed and there is no need for an extra audit. 
Given this, the firm’s expected profit, (1 — u) S 2 +  uS_2 — h  is always negative and 
the project should be terminated.
Shareholders can either rotate auditors when a second audit is needed to confirm 
the first report8 or remain with the same auditor that can make an audit revision and 
issue a restatement if she finds the first audit to be inaccurate.
Shareholders’ expected profit without a report is:
W  = (vu -f (1 — v) (1 — u )) S 2 +  (v (1 — u) +  (1 — v) u) S_2 ~  I
and it is assumed to be negative. The condition that ensures that shareholders’ 
expected utility with two reports W 2, exceeds IT1, the expected utility with one 
report only, which is derived below.
To simplify, it is assumed that the second-stage investment is undertaken after 
the second audit, however the results would not change if investment starts immedi­
ately after the first audit provided that it is concluded after the second audit: some 
investment is needed after the second audit as otherwise this would be worthless for 
the firm.
8 An auditor coming anew to a firm would always check whether previous reports are correct as 
she does not want to be responsible for mistakes that took place while she was not in charge of 
auditing the firm.
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3.3 Optimal Contract w ith Two Auditors and Two 
Signals
The primary focus of this section is on characterising the optimal contractual rela­
tionship between shareholders and two different auditors. The starting point of this 
approach is a simple model of auditing in which contractual relationships are not 
restricted. We then solve for the optimal relationship.
A contract for each auditor consists of transfers from the firm’s shareholders based 
on her report at of the private signal at collected during audit £, with t  =  {1,2}. 
Formally, a contract is a menu of lotteries on transfers depending on the auditor’s 
report a G It is summarised by the transfers to the first auditor
where o\ is the report and the real outcome, i.e., t (a, and t  (a, S i ) , if the auditor 
is correct and t(g_,S i) and t (a, S_x) if the auditor is incorrect; and the transfers to the 
auditor that performs the second audit, {t (a2, $  I <n)h where <72 is her report and <7i 
the report sent by the first auditor, i.e., t \ (?) and t (a, S \ \ a) if the auditor is
correct and t (<7 , S i \ a) and t (a, S_x \ a) if the auditor is incorrect.
The purpose of these transfers is to reward auditors for effort exertion, given all 
the information that is available about the project at the time auditors collect their 
private signal. This explains why the first auditor’s transfers are not conditioned on 
the second auditor’s report, whereas the second auditor’s transfers are conditioned on 
the first auditor’s report. The first auditor only has one piece of information at the 
time she collects her private signal, i.e. she only knows the prior about the project’s 
quality. Moreover the project’s outcome is always observable ex-post, regardless of the 
second auditor’s report. Hence, the second auditor’s report does not have an impact 
on the first auditor decision to exert effort and on how costly it is to make her exert
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effort. The second auditor, on the other hand, starts with two pieces of information: 
the prior and the first auditor’s report. Consequently, her belief about the quality of 
the project before collecting the private signal is no longer the prior belief but has 
been updated given the first auditor’s report. This has an impact on how costly it is 
to induce him to exert effort. Moreover, since S\ is perfectly observable, the transfers 
solely depend on Si and not on S 2.
Note that if shareholders can perfectly observe auditor’s effort, the incentive prob­
lem could be solved with a flat transfer equal to the cost of effort. The intuition is 
the following. In such a situation, an auditor receives either 0, if she exerts effort, 
or the cost of effort, otherwise. An auditor maximises profits but in both cases the 
auditor would make zero profits. However, when indifferent between exerting effort 
or not, auditors choose to exert effort9 consequently, a flat fee equal to the cost of 
effort guarantees effort exertion 10. Here, however the auditor may be tempted not to 
gather information and instead report the signal implying the highest expected trans­
fer. Therefore the auditor must be given incentives not only to gather information, 
but also to report the private signal accurately. As effort is not perfectly observable, a 
contingent contract is needed to motivate the desired level of audit effort, with trans­
fers dependent on the ex-post correctness of the audit report. The first-best contract 
is the least (expected) cost contingent contract that rewards auditors when they are 
right and imposes a penalty when they are incorrect.
In reality, auditors are compensated with a fixed fee as stated in Rule 302 on ” Con­
tingent Fees” of the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics. This rule determines that 
’’Professional services shall not be offered or rendered an arrangement whereby no fee
9This is the assumption behind the optimal contract and made throughout the paper.
10Or alternatively, paying e higher than the cost of effort, with e —> 0, would guarantee effort 
exertion.
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will be charged upon the findings or results of such services. However, a member’s 
fee may vary depending, for example, on the complexity of the service rendered...Fees 
are not regarded as being contingent if fixed by courts or other public authorities, or, 
in tax matters, if determined based on the results of judicial proceedings or the find­
ings of governmental agencies” . The analysis here abstracts from this and examines 
how auditors respond to the introduction of report-contingent audit contracts. Dye, 
Balachandram and Magee (1990) and Baiman, Evans and Noel (1987), among others, 
followed a similar approach.
Collusion between auditors is also ruled out.
3.3 .1  P o sterior  B e lie fs
The likelihood of a G {a, a} is given by p (a) and p (3> | a) is the probability of 
outcome $  conditional on a. For example, p (a) = v + (1 — v) (1 — 6) and p ( S i | a) =
-. In addition:u+(l—u)(l—0 )
Pis.) =  P (Si) -  p(a)p (£1 I er) =  (1 — v) e. (3 .1)
This equivalence will be used below.
Also note that the probability of signal a for any given signal a is denoted by 
p(cr | a), in particular the probabilities of a good and bad signal in the second audit 
given that the first audit generated a good signal are given by p (a \ a) — 
and p (a \ a) = respectively. The conditional probability of outcome d>
given (a, a), where the first a is related to the second audit and the second to the
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Finally, p | cr, cr) =  1 and p [S i | cr, a) = 0. It will also be useful to note that:
3 .3 .2  O p tim al C ontract
There are two adverse selection incentive constraints. Firstly, given that the first 
signal was a, the auditor should not prefer reporting a after having observed a, 
taking into account that when a <r-report is issued the auditor receives private benefit 
B  with probability | ,  i.e.:
If the first signal is <r, there is no second audit and investment I  is not undertaken. 
The contract must also satisfy a moral hazard incentive constraint to induce the
Pis. I ° ) = p { s  1 I <r)-p(<r I <r)p(St | a ,a ) =
6 (1 -  6) (1 -  v) 
p(a)
(3.4)
p (S i  | ( a , S i | a) + p ( S 1 | <r,a)t (<7,5, \o )  + -z
> p (Si | a, a) t (a, Si | a) +p{S,\ \ cr, cr) t I o) ■ (3.5)
On the other hand, the auditor should not prefer reporting cr after having observed
(3.6)
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auditor to gather information. If the auditor does not gather information, she can 
pretend she did and report the signal yielding the highest expected transfer. In a 
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, each auditor anticipates that the other gathers informa­
tion and reports it truthfully. Thus the moral hazard constraint is:
r  ___________ _
p (a \a )  p ( S  i | a , a ) t ( a , S i  \ a) | a, a) t (a, S x \ a) +  —
+p(a | a) {t | a))
p (Si | a) t (a, S! | a) +  p (Sx \ a) t {a, S x \ a) +  f ,
—ip > max \
p ( S i  1 a ) t ( a 1S 1 | a) + p ( S i | oOtfe:,#! | a)
Note that expectations on the right-hand-side (RHS) are based on the prior belief 
v and the message sent by the auditor in the first period. The RHS considers the 
two options available to auditors when effort is not exerted: to send a a- report and 
receive the private benefit with probability \  or send a a- report. The moral hazard 
constraints can be rewritten as follows:
p(g_\’3 ) t ( a , S l \ o ) -4 >>  (p(S, I a) - p ( a \  | a, a)) t \ a ) + p ( a \ a )  —
(3.7)
and
p(a | a) [p (Si | a, a) t (a, Si \ &) +p  (S^ \ a, a) t (a, S_1 \ v ) \ - ' i p >
P (Si | a) t (a, S i | a) +  (p (5 x | a) -  p(a  | a)) t ( a , ^  \ a) -  p(a \ (3.8)
Using (3.2) and (3.4), these two constraints imply the adverse selection constraints 
(3.5) and (3.6), therefore they can be ignored. This guarantees that report’s manipu- 
lability is irrelevant once the auditor is uninformed as otherwise remaining uninformed
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would be optimal. Expected transfers are derived from these constraints and limited 
liability: whenever the RHS of a constraint is positive, the corresponding transfer has 
to be positive; if it is negative the transfer is zero. Constraint (3.7) assures that the 
auditor has no incentive to issue a good report without acquiring information. From 
this constraint it is noted that the auditor has to be compensated for the foregone pri­
vate benefits in case a bad signal is received when effort is exerted. Correspondingly, 
constraint (3.8) assures that no bad reports are issued without private information. 
If the auditor collects a good report when effort is exerted, she enjoys from private 
benefits with probability thus the transfer that persuades auditors to exert effort 
can be lowered accordingly.
Consider now the auditor’s incentive to report the first signal truthfully keeping 
in mind that only when both reports are positive the project continues and only then 
the private benefit plays a role but that, in any case, the outcome is always verifiable 
in the last period. If the private signal a equals <7,
On the other hand, the auditor should not prefer reporting cr after having observed 
cr. Thus:
p ( S i  \ a ) t ( a , S 1) +^(£1  | a ) t ( a , S 1) + p { a \ a ) ^
(3.9)
t{g_,Sx) > t(c r,5 i) + p (c j I <7) ^ (3.10)
The moral hazard constraint is:
p(a)  (:p ( S 1 | a) t (<7,Si) + p ( £ i  | a) t  ( a , ^ ) )  + p ( a ) t ( a , S 1) +  ^ p ( a ) p ( a  \ a) -  ij; >
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I p ( S i ) t ( a , S i )  + p ( S 1) t (cr ,S1) + p ( a )  f ,
maX \ _
{ P i s j t & s j + P i s j t & s j
The moral hazard constraints become:
p(s.)t (2, 5 X) -  i> > (p (Si) -  p(a)p (S, I a)) t (a, 5 X) +  p (a) p (a \ a) ^  (3.11)
and
p(a) (p (Si | a) t (a, S i) +  p  (Sj | a) t (a, S ,)) -  i>
> p ( S i ) t ( a ,  S !) +  (p (Si) -  p(a)) t  (g_, S J  -  ^ p ( a ) p  (a \ a) (3.12)
respectively. Again Bayes’ rule, expression (3.1) and the fact that p (a) p ( a  \a)  equals 
p{g)p(a  | a) guarantee that both (3.11) and (3.12) imply the adverse selection con­
straints (3.10) and (3.9). Once more this rules out that remaining uninformed would 
be optimal. The constraints are interpreted as before but it is worth pointing out 
that according to (3.11) the optimal t is going to compensate the auditor for
the foregone benefit in case the second auditor issues a a-report and she is going to 
be penalised by ^p(a)p (a | a) in case both auditors issue a ^-report.
Finally, the auditor’s participation and limited liability constraints must be satis­
fied. As all transfers need to be positive or equal to zero, the participation constraints 
are automatically satisfied and are omitted henceforth.
To implement the first-best decisions at minimum costs, shareholders solve:
min p(a) ( p ( S  i \ a ) t  (a ,S i)  + p ( S i  | a) t ( a , ^ ) )  + p ( a ) t ( a , S 1)
{*(•)'«}
+ p ( v \ c f ) t { a , S 1 \ a ) + p { a \ a ) ( p ( S 1 \ a , a ) t ( a , S i  \ a ) + p ( S 1 \ a , a ) t ( a , S 1 | a))
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subject to (3.7), (3.8), (3.11), (3.12) and all t(.) >  0.
Note that t [a, S i | a) and t (a, S i) are not included in the expected audit cost as in 
both cases it is obvious that no effort has been exerted.
One could think of alternative forms that guarantee effort exertion at the minimum 
cost for shareholders. For example, one can wonder if it is better not to reveal the 
first report before the second auditor reveals her report, i.e., the first auditor’s report 
would only be known to shareholders and announced in simultaneous with the second 
report. But given the setup of the model, the second auditor can always anticipate 
that she is hired because the first report is good: a bad report in the first period 
is necessarily a bad project and since auditing is costly, shareholders only require a 
second report when the first report is good. This happens provided tha t the second 
auditor knows that a report has been issued already and that she has been hired as 
a second auditor. If auditors do not know whether a report has been issued, each 
auditor will find herself in a ’’first auditor” situation.
The derivation of the optimal transfers is relegated to the Appendix and the main 
results are summarised in the following proposition:
P ro p o sitio n  12. The optimal incentive contract with two auditors is as follows:
1. I f  B  < the optimal transfers are:
I (J, S , I g) -  -  |  m d  t I g ) -  (1 _  _ „  +  !
The remaining transfers are equal to zero.
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*. If ^  < B < then t (a, Si  | cr) equals zero. All the other transfers 
remain unchanged.
3. I f  B  > both t ( w , S i | a) and t  (<r, S\ )  equal zero. All the other transfers 
remain unchanged.
P roof. In the Appendix. ■
The first result of interest is that whenever auditors are wrong or commit fraud the 
optimal transfer is zero. The non-zero transfers have two components: one related to 
the cost of effort and one related to the private benefit. The higher the cost of effort 
the higher the transfer as auditors need to be rewarded for their effort. The private 
benefit increases the transfer when a bad report that is correct is issued but decreases 
it when a good report that is correct is issued. This makes sense as incentives to 
report a without private information are now stronger. However t (a, 5 X) adjustment 
to the private benefit in lower than f :  this happens because a zf-report gives the first 
auditor the possibility of enjoying the private benefit i f  the second auditor also sends 
a a-report. Hence, the opportunity cost of sending a zr-report is lower for the first 
auditor11. For the same reason one would expect t ( a , S i) to decrease by less than 
Y but this is not the case. Because t(a,S_1) is less affected by the private benefit, 
a lower t (a, S i) is also needed in order to convince the first auditor to exert effort 
rather than sending a effortless ^-report.
It is also derived that in equilibrium auditors are indifferent between gathering and 
truthfully disclosing information and not gathering information, and in this case they 
are indifferent between both reports, but only when the private benefit is low enough.
As the private benefit increases, the transfers when a <7-report is issued can decrease
11 The second auditor knows that a Zf-report always gives her the possibility of enjoying the private 
benefit.
as auditors have the extra compensation derived from B.  If B  is very large, the 
transfers generated by correct a-reports can even become negative. However, this is 
impossible due to limited liability and t (<r, S\  | a) and t (a, S i) increase just enough 
to satisfy the limited liability constraints but the other transfers are not modified 
as this violates the remaining constraints. Therefore, when the private benefit is 
high enough, auditors are indifferent between acquiring information and sending a 
a-report, but prefer acquiring information to sending a cr-report. This also means 
that if uninformed, auditors prefer sending a report.
The higher the prior belief u, the lower the private benefit needed to generate a 
situation where the transfers from sending a correct a-report are set equal to zero. 
This happens because a higher prior implies a lower cost of effort related component 
when a correct good report is issued. Hence a lower private benefit is necessary to 
convince auditors not to exert effort, send a good signal instead and receive the private 
benefit.
In addition, and independently of the private benefit B , t(a,S_l ) is higher than 
t Si )  if v exceeds i.e., a higher transfer is received whenever a good report is 
expected but a correct bad report is issued than when a correct good report is issued. 
The higher the private benefit the lower the threshold v for which t(a,S_1) exceeds 
t (a, Si ) .  In addition, t (cr, S_i \ a) is always higher than t (a, S ±) regardless of B. Such 
results mean that the higher the prior the higher the reward for ’’contradicting” it is 
going to be. This reflects the fact that because of moral hazard, agent’s rewards are 
linked with the outcomes that are most informative about effort exertion, here about 
having gathered information. This results are summarised in the Lemma 1:
L em m a 2. The optimal transfers are such that:
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1. I f  the prior belief v is lower than then t (a, S i) >  t {g_,S_x) ;
2. For any prior belief v, t (a, S_x \ a) > t i) and t (a, S i) >  t (a, S i \ a);
3. There exists a v* < \  such that, t (£, | a) > t (a, S i \ a) i f  v > v*; 
regardless of the private benefit
Trueman(1994) develops a model that studies the behaviour of analysts and con­
cludes that they exhibit herding behaviour in the sense that they release forecasts 
similar to those previously announced by other analysts. The results derived in this 
section go in the same direction: the optimal contract tends to reward auditors for 
contradicting the prior belief and previous reports as this constitutes evidence that 
effort was indeed exerted.
It is also useful to look at what would have happened if shareholders only required 
a single report. W ithout private benefits this is simply equal to the first auditor 
problem in the previous case but if private benefits are present, then the auditor is 
sure than when a ^-report is issued, the project continues and she receives the private 
benefit. The optimal transfers are therefore changed accordingly.
Lemma 3. The single audit optimal transfers are:
1. I f  B  < the optimal transfers are:
The remaining transfers are equal to zero.
2. I f  B  > then t (a, S i) equals zero. All the other transfers remain unchanged.
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3 .3 .3  E x p ec te d  U tilit ie s
This section calculates the expected utility or expected transfer of both auditors and 
of the firm’s shareholders. The first auditor’s expected utility is12:
W f  =  p(a)p (S1 \ a ) t ( a , S 1) +  p{a)t (a, S J  +  p (a) p (a \ a) ^  -  ip,
and the second auditor’s expected utility is given by:
  _
=  p(a | a ) p ( S i | a , a ) t  (a, Si  \ a ) + p ( a \ a ) t ( a , S i \ a ) + p ( a \ a )  — - i p
and is only paid with probability p(cr). In the absence of private benefits the first 
auditor receives on average13 ^  and the second . The expected transfer depends 
on the precision of the auditor’s report. The higher the precision the lower the ex­
pected profit: the higher the precision the lower the incentives needed to make an 
auditor exert effort.
For the lowest interval of private benefits, i.e. B  < the first auditor ex­
pected transfer increases to ^ and the second auditor expected transfer
is now p(cf) ^  • In the middle range of benefits, the expected transfers
are ^ and p (a )^  respectively. Lastly, when private benefits are very high
both auditors expect to receive p((r) ^ .
Hence, the higher the private benefit the higher the expected transfer. When 
the private benefit is very high, W *  equals because some transfers are capped 
to zero ( t ( a , S i  \ a) and t ( a , S i)) and the remaining transfers, in particular the 
transfer of the first auditor has already been adjusted for the fact that she receives
12Note that p(a)p (Si \ a) equals p(o)p{o \ a)p (S\ \ a , a ) .
13That is also equal to the expected fee in the single auditor case.
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B  with probability |  when she and the second auditor both issue a a-report. Hence 
the expected transfer increases less than proportionally with j ,  contrarily to what 
happens with the expected transfer of the auditor that is in charge of the second 
audit. The following lemma summarises the results:
L em m a 4. With no private benefits an auditor’s expected fee is ^  if  she is hired 
for the first audit and p(o) |  if  she is hired for the second audit. This expected fee 
increases with the private benefit and when B  exceeds she expects to receive p(o) ^  
independently of when she is hired.
Finally, shareholders’ expected profit for the extra investment when one report is 
issued
W 1 =  p(5! I a)p (<f) (uS2 + ( l - u ) S 2 - t ( W , S 1) - l )
+p(S1 | a)p (?) ((1 -  u) S 2 +  uS2 -  I) -  p(a)t (a, S,) 
and with two reports
W 2 = p(S i | o,o)p(o,o)  (uS2 +  (1 — u)S^ — t (o', Si) — t (o,S\  \ o) — /)
+P(£i I °)P ( o ) ( ( l - u ) S 2 + uS2 -  I) -  p(o)t (o, S J  -  p(o | o)p (a) t (o, S_i | o ) .
These expressions simplify to,
W 1 = V ( u S 2 +  (1 -  u)52 -  +  b )  + (1 -  0) (1 -  v) ((1 -  u ) S 2 + uSs )
— p(o)B — p(o) I
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and
W 2 =  v ( uS 2 + ( 1 - u) S 2 - ^ - ' ^ j ^ -  + b \ + ( 1 - 6 ) 2 ( 1 - v ) ( ( 1 - u) S 2 +  uS 2)
- ip  -  {p{a) (1 — 0) ) B — 'ipp (a) — p {a, a) I.
The difference between W 2 and W 1 can be written as — —p{o) (2 — 6) B —ipp (&) —
(1 — 0)2 (1 — v)6  ((1 — u) S 2 +  uS.2) + I  (1 — v) (1 — 0) 6. It follows that (1 — u) S 2 +  
uS_2 is negative as u is lower than \  hence, shareholders always prefer two signals 
rather than one if the private benefit and the cost of effort are low relative to the 
project outcome and investment level.
3.4 Optimal Contract w ith One Auditor and Two 
Signals
Auditors are sometimes required to certify the same accounts twice. This happens for 
example with quarterly financial statements that are also revised during the annual 
audit14. For this reason, this section looks at situations where the same auditor is 
required to make two sequential reports about the quality of the project’s first stage.
This auditor faces a conflict of interest: if she sees that the first stage is unsuc­
cessful, investors will not want to invest any more and she will forgo the transfer next 
period. By manipulating information she still has the possibility of covering this up in 
the next period: a longer relationship with the firm gives the auditor the possibility of
14As explained in the introduction, Myers et al. (2004) and Choi and Doogar (2005) find that 
quarterly financial reports restatements increase with auditor tenures, i.e. the longer an auditor 
remains in the firm, the more frequent this type of restatements are.
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revising previous reports. Shareholders want the auditor to be truthful and to reveal 
her information even if this goes against what she previously stated but on the other 
hand she should be truthful in the first period and not rely on the second period to 
fix her mistakes or incorrect reports.
A contract in this case consists of transfers from the firm’s shareholders based 
on the auditor’s reports a =  (<7i,ai) of her private signals for both audits or only 
one if the private signal is g_. Formally, a contract is summarised by the following 
transfers: if the signal in the first period is g_ and it is truthfully reported the auditor 
receives t(a,S_i) and if she is not truthful the transfer is t(a,S[i).  If the signal in 
the first period is a is followed by another a-report, the auditor receives t (a, Si ,  a) 
if she is correct and t (a,S_i,a)  if the auditor is incorrect. If the second report is g_, 
the transfers are t {q_,S_i,o) if she is correct and t (o_, S i, a) otherwise.
A difference relative to the previous case is that an auditor may now enjoy cost 
savings when exerting effort for the second time, i.e. familiarity with the firm implies a 
lower cost of effort, ip, in the second period. Also, the auditor is entitled to receive the 
private benefit after two consecutive good reports whereas before this would happen 
with probability
3 .4 .1  O p tim al C ontract
There are two adverse selection incentive constraints. Firstly, given that the first
signal was a, the auditor should not prefer reporting a after having observed a i.e.:
p (S i  | a, a) t (a, S i, a) +p{S_i \ a, a) t (a, 5 1} a) +  B  
>  p{S.i I 0 , 0 ) t {0 ,S_i,a) - \ -p(Si  | a, a) t (a, Si ,  a ) . (3.13)
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The auditor is also sure that two consecutive <r-reports guarantee the extra investment 
and therefore the private benefit. On the other hand, the auditor should not prefer 
reporting a after having observed a:
t f o  S .11 ^0 >  t  +  B  (3-14)
If the first signal is g_, there is no second audit.
Again, the contract must also satisfy a moral hazard incentive constraint to induce 
the auditor to gather information, i.e.,
p ( a \ a )  [p (Si  \ a , a ) t ( a , S 1,a) + p ( S 1 \ v , a ) t ( a , S 1,a) + B ] + p ( a \ a ) ( t ( s . , S 1,a))
~ j p (S i  I S') (t ( a , S u a)) + p ( S 1 I a) t ( W, Su W) + B,  \
—ip >  max < . (3.15)
y p ( S i  \ a ) t ( a , S i , a )  + p ( S 1 \ a ) t ( a , S i , a )
The moral hazard constraints can be rewritten as follows:
p(a | a)t  (a,  S „  a) -  $  > (p (S, | a) -  p(a | a)p (S, | a, a)) t (a, S v a) + Bp(a \ a)
(3.16)
and
p(a  | a) [p (S i | o, a) t  (a, S i, a) + p(S_i \ (7,7?) t (a, S i, a) +  B] — ip>
p ( S i  | a) t (a, Si ,  a) +  (p (5 x | a) - p ( a  \ a ) ) t ( a , S i , a ) . (3.17)
Using (3.4) the first inequality implies the adverse selection constraint (3.14). Hence, 
it can be ignored and the second one implies (3.13) as p( a  \ a ) p  (S1 | a, <j) equals
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p(S 1 I a).
Consider now the auditor’s incentive to report the first signal truthfully. If o =  a, 
the firm’s shareholders will ask for a second signal, i.e.,
p ( a \ a )  (p(Si  | a ,a ) t  (a, Si, a) + p ( 5 i  | a, o r )  t (a, S lt a) + B)  + p(g_ \ a)t(g:,S1,a)
> p ( S i  | t f t f a  Si) + p ( S i | a)t(a,S_i) . (3.18)
On the other hand, the auditor should not prefer reporting a after having observed 
g_. If the expert reports a good signal, she will find it optimal under condition (3.16) 
to report a bad second signal, hence she will not gather a second signal and reports 
the signal gathered in the first period. Thus:
t fc iS i) >  t ((L,Si,a)  . (3.19)
Finally, the moral hazard constraint needed to induce the auditor to gather the first 
signal can be written as:
p{a)p (a | or) (p (Si | a, a) t (a, S u a ) + p  (Sx | a ,a ) t  {a, S lt W) +  B)  
+p(a)p (g_\a)t (a, S ^ a )  -  p(W)$ + p (a) t{a, ) -  ip >
max
p(cr) (p (S i | a) t (a, S i, a) + p { S 1 \ a) t (a, S j , a) +  B ) +p{&)t (a, S x, a) - i p ,  
p ( S i ) t ( a , S i )  + p ( S 1) t ( a , S 1) , p (Si)  t (a, S u a) + p ( S x) t (a, S i , a ) , 
p ( S i ) t  (a, S i , a ) + p  (Sj) t (a, S lt W) +  B.
(3.20)
The RHS reflects that the relevant possibilities are to gather only one signal and
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report accordingly after having reported <r, not to exert effort in both periods and 
report a bad signal in the first period or wait and do it in the second period, or always 
report a good signal. Finally the auditor’s limited liability constraints must also be 
satisfied, i.e., all transfers need to be positive. It will be optimal to set t ( a , S i,<f) 
equal to zero as it relaxes the RHS of the third constraint of (3.20) and does not affect 
the expected transfer. Hence, this constraint can be ignored using (3.19). Therefore, 
(3.20) can be simplified as follows:
P fe) t(g_, S J  -  p (a )$  -  Bp(a)p ( a \ a ) >
P(v) (P (£i \ a ) - p ( a \ a ) p ( S 1 \ a, a)) t (a, S lt a) +  (p(a) -  p(a)p (a \ a)) t (a, S ly c r ) ,
(3.21)
p(a)p (a | a) (p (Sj. \ a, a) t (a, S u a ) + p  (Sx | a , a ) t  (a, S r , a) +  B)
-\-p(a)p {a\ a ) t  {a, S v a ) -  p(a)4) -  ^  > (p (5 X) -  p (v)) t {a,  S j + p f S ^ t  (a, Sx) ,
(3.22)
and the last one is
p(a)p (a\  W)t (a, S v a)-\ -p (a) t (a, S J
> (P (& ) -  p(°)p (or | a) p (5i \ a 1a))t (cr1S l i a)+il>+ p (a )$  +  B  (1 -  p{a)p (a \ a ) ) .
(3.23)
Again, using Bayes’ rule and (3.1), the adverse selection constraint (3.18) can be 
ignored as it is implied by constraint (3.22). However, by looking at (3.21) it is not 
immediately obvious that (3.19) is also satisfied hence this constraint is not going to 
be ignored.
85
The optimal contract is the solution to the problem:
min p(a)p(a ,a ) (p (S 1 \ a, a) t (a, a, S i) + p ( S t \ a ,a ) t {a ,a , S ^ )
+p (a, a) t (a, S ^ a ) - ^  p{a)t (a, S x) 
subject to (3.16), (3.17), (3.21), (3.22), (3.23), (3.19) and all * (.) >  0 
Hence, the following result is derived:
P ro p o s itio n  13. I f  one auditor is to report twice the optimal incentive contract is:
P roof. In the Appendix. ■
The analysis focuses initially on the case where there are no private benefits and no 
cost savings in information collection. Shareholders want to prevent an auditor from 
delaying bad news. For this to happen it is enough that the reward from a correct 
bad report issued in the first audit, t(a,S_j), equals the reward derived from a bad 
report in the second audit that corrects a good report issued in the first audit, given 
by t (cr,iS1? a). In the two-auditor case timing manipulation is not an issue therefore 
the first auditor does not need to be so highly rewarded when she issues a correct bad 
report, whereas the reward for the second period audit that results in a correct bad
t(g:, S u a) =
t (pi,S_i) =  max
i)e(i-vj + B  th e n t ( a ,S u a) =  max jo, + % -  #}. I f t ^ S ^
e(i_v) +  B  then t (<j, S i, a) = {0, ^  — B }  . The remaining transfers are equal to zero.
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report equals the equivalent reward in the single auditor case, i.e. t (a, S x | a) equals 
t (a, a). This happens because the incentives to exert effort and the informational
level are exactly the same in both situations. Finally, two consecutive and correct good 
reports issued by the single auditor yield a higher reward than a second good report 
that turns out to be correct in the two-auditor case, i.e. t (a, S i, cf) is higher than 
t (a, S i | <t). This is obviously the case as the latter rewards effort in two consecutive 
periods and the former rewards effort in the last period only. In addition, regarding 
a single auditor for two correct good reports is cheaper than rewarding two auditors 
with the same consecutive reports that are correct. This happens because in the first 
period, before any signal has been collected, the single auditor has an extra option 
relative to the two-auditor case: in the previous section when a a-report was collected 
the auditor could either be right or wrong but now she has the opportunity to collect 
another private signal and if wrong has an extra chance to fix her mistake.
Moreover, in the case with no private benefits and no cost savings, the auditor 
is going to be indifferent between gathering information and reporting truthfully in 
both periods and gathering information in the second period only, and this is better 
than gathering no information and sending two consecutive good reports.
Hence,
L em m a 5. With no private benefit and no cost savings in information collection, 
t G l a) equals t (a, S_t \ a) and the remaining non-zero transfers t (a, S_i) andt (<r, S i, a) 
are higher than t (&,S_i) and t (cf, S i | a) respectively. In addition, t  (a, S i, a) is lower 
than the sum of t (w, S i)  and t (a, S i \ a ) .
W ith cost savings in information collection, the results change slightly. The in­
tuition is the following: as the cost of the second audit, rp, decreases and eventually
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tends to zero, collecting information in both periods becomes increasingly preferred to 
gathering information in the second period only as with two signals the auditor issues 
a more reliable report at a very low incremental cost (or in the limit at no extra cost 
at all), and the relevant choice starts being whether or not to exert effort in the initial 
period, i.e. constraint (3.21) is relaxed and the binding constraint at some point be­
comes (3.23), meaning that the auditor is indifferent between gathering information 
in both periods or sending (a, a). As a result the reward for a correct bad report 
in the initial audit, t(a,S_i), needs to increase to convince the auditor to exert the 
initial effort. But the second period problem remains the same and consequently this 
reward is now higher than sending a correct bad report in the second audit. However, 
the new cost of effort ip can be positive in order to achieve this result. In fact, there is 
a ip* equal to such that if ip > ip* the constraint (3.21) is binding but if ip < ip* 
constraint (3.23) becomes the relevant one.
The transfer that rewards correct bad reports in the first audit, t (a, 5 j), increases 
from =y to and the transfer t (<r, S i, a) tha t rewards two consecutive and correct 
good reports is no longer p j p  +  ^ and becomes instead i.e. equals the reward 
that is given to the first auditor in the two-auditor case when she rightly sends a good 
report, t (a, S i) .
Note that the incentives to gather information in the first period once effort is 
assured in the second period, are the same as those faced by a single auditor that 
issues a unique report. This happens because mistakes only occur with the incorrect 
observation of a cf-signal when the outcome is bad. Thus the joint probabilities 
p (S, a, a) and p (S, a) are constant and equal to the prior belief v. Intuitively, as 
ip —► 0, there will always be information gathering in the second period and both 
auditors just need to decide whether to gather information once.
L em m a 6. With cost savings in information collection, t(a,S_1,a) is lower than 
t (<L *2i I <7) • Transfer t (g,S_i) is either higher or equal to t (g,S_i) and t (a, S 1, if) is 
still lower than the sum o f t  (a, S i \ a) and t (a, S 1).
Finally, with private benefits, the auditor has to be compensated for the private 
benefit foregone by sending a a-report that is correct: hence t (g, S x) and t (g, S_i, 
both increase by B. On the other hand, the transfer for two correct good reports, 
t decreases by B. As before this transfer needs to be positive, hence the
private benefit cannot be too high.
L em m a 7. I f  the private benefits are high enough t ( g a n d  t(g,S_i) are higher 
than t (g, S x | a) and t (g, S x) respectively. Transfer t (<r, Si, a) is still lower than the 
sum of t (a, S i \ a) and t (a, S i ) .
In addition, the optimal transfers can be ordered in the following way:
L em m a 8. The optimal transfers can be ordered as follows:
t ( g , Si )  >t (g,S_i ,a)
The transfer t (<r, S i, a) can be higher than t {g,S_i) (and t {g,S_i,^)) i f  v and B  are 
low enough.
The transfer t (a, S i, a) can be higher than t(g,S_i) (and t(a ,S_i,a)) for a low 
private benefit, a high difference between the two effort costs and a low v. However as 
the difference in the cost of effort increase, a new t (g, Sj) is calculated and only a low 
private benefit and a low v can assure a higher t (a, S i, a) relative to the remaining 
non-zero transfers.
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A curious conclusion is that if cost savings are very high, a lower private benefit 
is needed in order for the auditor to extract an extra rent due to limited liability.
3 .4 .2  E x p ec ted  U tilit ie s  and C om parison  B etw een  th e  T w o  
C ases
The auditor’s expected utility is now given by the following expression:
W A = p(a)t (a, 5 j) -  ^ + p(v)
p(t7 I cr)p (S1 I cr,a)t  (a, S u a)
 ^ + p ( ° \ o :) t (g: ,S1 \ a ) + p ( a \ W ) B - i p  J
When no private benefits and no cost savings are considered the auditor’s expected 
transfer is that can be compared to the sum of the two auditors expected
transfer, i.e. ^ . Since 6 is higher than the expected transfer for the single
auditor is higher provided that v is higher than i.e., that t (a, S^), that increased
in order to prevent manipulation, is high enough to overcome the fact that transfer 
t (a, S i, a) is lower than the sum of t (a, S i) and t (a, S i \ a ) .
Introducing cost savings, the expected transfer depends on the strength of the cost 
reduction:
w A  = [  * * * % > *
\  i  if^ < ^
Obviously, a decrease in the cost of effort decreases the single auditor expected trans­
fer, but it is capped at ^  even if the new cost of effort becomes zero. Note that ^ is 
just the expected transfer derived in single audit or/single report case. This happens 
because, as discussed above when cost savings are high enough both problems are 
equivalent. It is interesting to notice that the new cost of effort does not need to be
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zero for this to happen. Hence:
L em m a 9. When cost savings are high enough, the single auditor’s expected fee is 
independent of the level of cost savings and it is equal to the expected fee in the single 
auditor/single report case.
Introducing private benefits but still without cost savings, changes the expected 
transfer as follows:
The introduction of the private benefit increases the transfer but as the private benefit 
increases and because of limited liability, t (a ,S i,<r) is capped at zero and the ex­
pected transfer suffers a jump: it increases directly because of the private benefit and 
because t (a, S i, a) cannot adjust (decrease) further. Note that +  (1 — v) B  can 
be higher or lower than the sum of the expected transfers of the two auditors in the 
previous Section. However, in this case the highest expected transfers are achieved
for B higher than whereas in the two-auditor case B  needs to exceed |£ ,
which is definitely higher than And if B  is very high, i.e., higher than
W A exceeds W A +  W A for sure as the latter only equals p(ff)B. Thus, W A +  W A 
can start by exceeding W A, but this is reversed as B  increases (although W A +  W A 
jumps twice W A +  W A and W A cross at most once).




f +  (1 - v ) B
Looking at the first two cases, VLj4 +  W A can also start by exceeding W A, and 
again this is reversed as B  increases but a higher B  is needed for this to happen as 
the cost of effort related component of the expected transfer is now lower. And this 
happens for sure because when the private benefit is very high, the expected transfer 
is simply B  which is higher than p(a)B. Hence, the private benefit can totally crowd 
out the effect of the cost saving.
L em m a 10. I f  the private benefit is high enough, the single auditor/two reports ex­
pected net income is simply equal to B . In this case, no matter how strong the cost 
savings are, the expected fee is always higher than the sum of the individual expected 
net income.
But which situation is going to be preferred by the firm’s shareholders? The 
number of different cases is very high so the algebra is relegated to the Appendix and 
the main results are summarised below:
L em m a 11. 1. With no private benefits and no cost savings in information col­
lection, the firm 's shareholders prefer a single auditor if  ^  exceeds This
happens when v is sufficiently high.
2. Cost savings in information collection determine that shareholders prefer a sin­
gle auditor when |  exceeds — p(&) ( ^ ) ,  i-e., for a lower level of
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v relative to the previous case. I f  cost savings are sufficiently high, shareholders 
always prefers a single auditor.
3. With private benefits, |  needs to exceeds +  6 (1 — v) f- for shareholders not 
to rotate auditors, i.e., for a higher level of v relative to case 1. When private 
benefits are sufficiently high, auditor rotation is always preferred.
f .  When private benefits and cost savings coexist, a higher private benefit is needed 
for shareholders to switch from a single to a two-auditor situation.
P ro o f. In the Appendix. ■
Transfer t (a, S i , if) is always lower than t (<r, S) +  t (a, S \ \ a) and t ( £ ,$ 1) in­
creased relative to t in order to avoid manipulation. Therefore, when v is high
shareholders are more likely to pay the transfers that reward correct good reports. 
This means that the single auditor case is preferred because shareholders are more 
likely to pay the ’’cheaper” t (a, S i, a) (relative to t (a, S) + t  (<f, S i | a ))  and, on the 
other hand, they are less likely to pay the ’’expensive” t {a,S_x) (relative to t (er, S^)). 
W ith cost savings a single auditor becomes increasingly preferred, but private benefits 
have a greater impact on the single auditor’s transfers than on the transfers derived 
in the two-auditor case and end up undoing the gain that resulted from cost savings. 
Also note that a higher 6 makes the effect from cost savings less important.
3.5 Extensions and Policy Implications
3 .5 .1  A u d itor  L iab ility
W ith limited liability the auditor receives a zero transfer whenever mistakes or fraud 
occurs. But in reality, auditors are subject to unlimited liability. Introducing unlim­
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ited liability in the model, would not dramatically change the results. The assumption 
of risk neutrality means that individual transfers would change but expected transfers 
would remain the same. However, it would definitely limit the number of cases to look 
at: with the introduction of the private benefit limited liability prevents some trans­
fers from becoming negative, but this would not be an issue if there was unlimited 
liability and the auditor would be unable to extract extra rents.
3 .5 .2  A cco u n tin g  T ransparency and C orp orate  G overn ance
Most observers of the Enron debacle agree that its intention to circumvent existing 
accounting rules by hiding large amounts of debt from the public was one contribut­
ing factor of the final explosion. It achieved this by shifting its debts off its balance 
sheet. Therefore there is an ongoing debate about how to make accounting proce­
dures more transparent. For example, the Washington Post has recently reported that 
the SEC has suggested that ” (...) accounting practices related to real estate leases, 
employee pension plans and financial instruments known as derivatives remain par­
ticularly complex and opaque(...)” and ”(...)urged standard-setters at the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board to determine whether changes are needed to eliminate 
possible trouble spots”15.
In this model less confusing accounting rules could be translated in a higher prob­
ability of identifying failures, i.e., a higher 6. For example, when 6 tends to 1 share­
holders only require a single audit in order to make the right investment decision and 
information gathering and disclosure becomes considerably less costly the higher 9 
is. Alternatively, accounting transparency could also imply a lower cost of effort for 
auditors. From Lemma 13, it can be seem that as the cost of effort tends to zero,
15”SEC Calls for Transparency” in the Washington Post of 15/06/2005.
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shareholders are indifferent between rotating and not rotating auditors, unless there 
are private benefits. In this case, auditor rotation is always preferred. Hence, making 
accounting procedures more transparent makes the organisational design of auditing 
less relevant.
Good corporate governance can also be translated in a lower probability of incor­
rect audits in particular if one thinks that good corporate governance mechanisms 
make it more difficult for managers to disguise unfavourable information. But it can 
also result in lower levels of private benefit: shareholders monitor managers more 
closely which makes it more difficult for them to ’’bribe” auditors into not disclos­
ing unfavourable information. In this case, better governance combined with more 
accounting transparency would make shareholders increasingly indifferent between 
rotating auditors or not. To put it in another way, more accounting transparency 
would, in the context of this model, make costs savings in information collection less 
important and therefore, the advantage of a having a single auditor would disappear. 
On the other hand, better governance makes the disadvantage of a single auditor also 
disappear: the fact that the private benefit is received for sure by the single auditor 
in case the project is undertaken and only with probability \  in the two-auditor case, 
makes auditing with a single auditor more costly; if private benefits disappear, this is 
no longer a problem. In the limit, both cases converge.
To sum up, regulation of the audit profession seem to be less relevant with better 
governance (lower B  and higher 6) and more accounting transparency (higher 6 or 
lowers ip and ip).
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter looks at a situation where shareholders need an auditor to certify the 
financial reports provided by the firm’s managers. However, because auditors can 
make mistakes, an auditor’s initial report can be revised. At this point, the firm’s 
shareholders are faced with a dilemma as they can either keep or replace the auditor 
that produced the initial report. If an auditor knows she is going to remain on the 
firm for a sufficiently long period she feels tempted to delay the announcement of 
’’bad news” if this results in a higher expected income but on the other hand, having 
an auditor that is more familiar with the firm means that she is more efficient when 
looking for genuine mistakes. Such a set-up incorporates some of the trade-offs that 
are present when there is auditor rotation.
The optimal contract between shareholders and auditors is such that auditors 
are rewarded if and only if their reports are proved to be correct and they tend 
to receive a higher reward when they correctly contradict previous reports or make 
correct announcements that ex-ante appear less likely given what is publicly known 
about the quality of the project. The model also assesses the effect of private benefits 
and it concludes that they lower the transfers made to auditors for correct good 
reports but increase the transfers when it is obvious that the auditor has forgone the 
private benefit, i.e. when correct bad reports are issued. If the private benefit exceeds 
a certain threshold, auditors extract extra rents because of limited liability.
Shareholders’ initial opinion about the project determines whether the firm prefers 
keeping the same auditor or not when there is the need for confirmation of the first 
report. Having a single auditor is preferred if the prior belief is higher than a certain 
threshold. This happens because if shareholders believe the project is a success, a
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transfer for a correct bad report in the first audit, which is higher in the single­
auditor case to avoid manipulation, is less likely to be paid and auditors are instead 
more likely to be rewarded for correct good reports whose corresponding transfers are 
lower in the case of a single auditor. Cost savings in information collection results in 
a lower threshold but the existence of private benefits crowds out the positive effect 
of the cost savings.
More accounting transparency, that takes the form of a lower likelihood of making 
mistakes, makes auditing cheaper and simplifies the auditing process. This is im­
portant for regulators as there is an on-going debate about how flexible accounting 
standards should be: some flexibility is necessary given the extreme complexity of 
some activities developed by firms but too much flexibility opens the door to subjec­
tivity, manipulation and fraud.
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Chapter 4 
The R esolution of Co-ordination  
Failures in Financial D istress
4.1 Introduction
The way firms deal with financial distress is determined to a large extent by their debt 
structures. Debt structures are typically composed by several classes of debt, with 
multiple creditors in each class. This fact makes debt renegotiation a lengthy and 
complex process, as creditors try  to position themselves strategically. For example, in 
the situation where a debtor fails if an insufficient number of bondholders agrees to 
roll over debt or accept an exchange offer, each bondholder may only want to accept 
the offer if the other bondholders accept it as well. This can lead to a situation where 
bondholders want to withdraw their support before others do so, akin to a bank run 
as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), even though creditors - as a group - would be best 
served by agreeing to a restructuring.
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However, there is empirical and anecdotal evidence1 that suggests that banks and 
other large creditors can facilitate the resolution of financial distress as they can 
signal to the remaining (and possibly small and less informed) creditors how well 
they expect a firm to perform. Also, there is often an element of formal voting in 
the restructuring of distressed firm, i.e., firms use voting requirements as a way to 
ensure that at least a minimum number of creditors agree with the restructuring and 
in this way limit creditors’ withdrawals to a level that does not compromise the firm’s 
chances of recovery. This aims at making the decision of staying with the firm more 
appealing and at convincing the more doubtful that the firm is viable as there is a 
significant number of creditors whose optimism is enough to back the firm in such a 
difficult situation.
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to assess to what extent these two mecha­
nisms (large creditors and voting requirements) can be used as co-ordination devices 
in the renegotiation of public debt.
This is a model of a financially distressed firm with outstanding private and pub­
lic debt. Each creditor must decide independently whether or not to agree with a 
reorganisation plan proposed by the firm. The reorganisation plan is similar to a 
debt-for-equity exchange offer and consists of replacing existing debt by an equity 
claim on the firm. Both the large creditor (possibly a bank) and a critical majority 
of small creditors (possibly bondholders) need to restructure their claims or the firm 
will otherwise be liquidated. But crucially, any funds withdrawn from the firm during 
renegotiation need to be replaced by (or paid off using) new funds or the firm will 
otherwise be liquidated. Think of a situation where all the firm’s funds are invested in 
machinery or other fixed assets that are crucial for the firm’s productive activity and
1 Discussed below.
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cannot be sold off to generate funds to pay creditors that refuse to renegotiate. The 
firm has instead to raise new funds to cover for these withdrawals and it is very likely 
that this generates an extra cost to the firm. Hence, the more creditors withdraw the 
lower are the firm’s chances of success. This in turn, discourages further acceptances 
of the reorganisation package and generates even more withdrawals of funds from the 
firm. This situation is analogous to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and also here there 
are impatient creditors who withdraw their claims and prefer to invest in the risk free 
asset and patient creditors who agree to the renegotiation plan and stay with the firm 
for an extra period.
This chapter argues that the presence of a large creditor can facilitate the reor­
ganisation of public debt but this depends on how informed she is relative to small 
creditors. For example, perfect co-ordination of the actions of small creditors is derived 
if she has precise information, regardless of how noisy the small creditors’ information 
is, even i f  they do not learn the large creditor’s decision prior to being confronted 
with the renegotiation plan. Small creditors always agree to renegotiate and let the 
decision of the large creditor determine the outcome of renegotiation. This happens 
because renegotiation is successful if the large creditor also agrees to exchange her 
claim and small creditors know that since she is precisely informed she will not let 
the firm continue for it to default in the last period. When the large creditor decision 
is announced before renegotiation takes place, small creditors simply mimic the large 
creditor behaviour. On the other hand, the large creditor plays a very insignificant 
role when small creditors are those whose information is precise.
As far as the role of the voting requirement is concerned, it does not affect rene­
gotiation when the large creditor is the one that is precisely informed but it becomes 
more relevant as a co-ordination device as the informational advantage of the large
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creditor disappears. In fact, it is derived that renegotiation is always easier in a 
game with voting requirements than in a game without, for any other level of relative 
precision of private information between the two groups of creditors.
In addition, in order for the large creditor to make use of her private information, 
her initial claim needs to be secured otherwise she has nothing to gain by liquidating 
and consequently will always agree with renegotiation2. This result holds when she 
is pivotal for a successful renegotiation. This is not the case for a small creditor: the 
fact that his initial claim is secured does not affect his decision about renegotiation 
because an individual small creditor is not pivotal and his payoff in case of liquidation 
does not vary with the direction of his vote.
The framework of the model is one of an exchange offer but in practice, a firm that 
needs to restructure its debt is faced with two choices: it can either file for bankruptcy 
(Chapter 11 in the US) or attem pt to reorganise with its creditors privately (exchange 
offer). Under Chapter 11, approval for a reorganisation plan is required from a spec­
ified majority of the creditors in each class of claims, and dissenting classes can be 
forced to comply with the plan under the Code’s cram-down provision. When adopt­
ing a private debt restructuring, participation in the offer is voluntary but the success 
of the exchange offer is often conditional on a stipulated voting majority of bonds 
being tendered.
Empirically, both types of reorganisations are important. Gilson, John and Lang 
(1990) investigate the incentives of financially distressed firms to restructure their 
debt privately rather than through formal bankruptcy and conclude that about half 
successfully restructure their debt outside of Chapter 11. They also show that finan­
2The large creditor can also be indifferent if she is precisely informed and her private information 
indicates that the firm will default even if renegotiation succeeds.
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cial distress is more likely to be resolved privately when firms have more intangible 
assets, owe more of their debt to banks and owe to fewer lenders. The implications 
of the capital structure for the renegotiation process are also documented in James 
(1995,1996) where he finds evidence that bank participation in debt restructurings fa­
cilitates public debt exchange offers and increases the likelihood of achieving minimum 
tendering rates.3
These issues have also been widely debated on a sovereign level as in recent years 
countries have turned increasingly from bank loans to bond issues to raise capital; 
this broadens the investor base available to provide financing for emerging market 
sovereigns but on the other hand creditors have become increasingly numerous, anony­
mous and difficult to co-ordinate in case a reorganisation is needed.
In fact, ever since the Mexican, Asian and Russian crises of the mid-1990’s ef­
forts have been made to find means for more effective prevention and resolution of 
financial crises. There are a number of proposals currently under consideration that 
acknowledge the importance of the firm’s debt structure and co-ordination problems 
that arise when renegotiation takes place. One of these proposals directly addresses 
creditors’ co-ordination problems by claiming that they can be mitigated via changing 
the voting requirements in restructurings, for instance by including so-called collective 
action clauses (CACs) in bond covenants, which stipulate a critical majority in the 
creditors’ vote to restructure the claims.
There is a vast theoretical literature on debt renegotiation but it is mostly focused 
on the case of a ’’representative” creditor. An exception is for example, Detragiache 
and Garella (1996) that construct an analytical framework to analyse exchange offers
3See also Asquith, Gertner and Scharfetein (1994) and Frank and Torous (1994) for more empirical 
evidence on this topic.
102
that exploits the analogy between debt renegotiation and the problem of financing 
the provision of a public good through private contributions. The debtor engages in 
a form of ” price discrimination” because creditors contribute to debt forgiveness by 
choosing to exchange a different fraction of their loan portfolio depending on the utility 
that they expect to receive in case of bankruptcy More recently, Morris and Shin 
(2002b) model a contribution game using the global games methodology. However, 
neither considers the case where a firm has different debt claims or explicitly models 
the impact of the voting requirements.
An alternative approach that also looks at voting amongst creditors in case of 
financial distress is presented by Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), who frame the dis­
cussion in terms of ex-post bargaining problems in a cooperative game theory setting. 
In their model, lenders have the right to seize assets in case of default. A large number 
of lenders makes renegotiations more difficult. This can be an advantage, as it deters 
firms from strategic default (where the owners are in a position to service their debt 
but refuse to do so), but of course creates problems in the case of a liquidity default 
(where the firm is fundamentally viable, but has short-term liquidity problems). Even 
though they examine the role of voting requirements, it is arguable whether cooper­
ative game theory is the ideal framework in which to examine a problem created by 
a lack of cooperation.
A recent paper by Bond and Eraslan (2005) also looks at the effect of different 
voting rules in debt restructuring in a situation where the firm has multiple creditors 
with informational differences. In particular, they find out that, because information 
aggregation fails under the unanimity rule, the debtor needs to offer a reorganisa­
tion package that is more favourable to creditors. Consequently, unanimity rules give 
creditors higher recovery rates. But if markets turn out to be illiquid, unanimity rules
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make reorganisation almost impossible, hurting creditors and the debtor alike4. How­
ever, they address neither coordination problems among creditors, nor the signalling 
role of large creditors as a coordination device.
Many have also focussed on the role of banks in reorganisation. Diamond (1984) 
points out that a financial intermediary (a bank) can solve the free-rider and informa­
tion duplication problems in monitoring a firm. In Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994a), 
banks are beneficial because they devote more resources to evaluating whether to liq­
uidate or continue in a firm in Chapter 11. On the other hand, Rajan (1992) points 
at some problems linked with bank debt: bank debt is more flexible but banks have 
bargaining power and expropriative incentives over the firm’s profits if a short-term 
crisis arises.
The role of a firm’s debt structure as a determinant of how it fares in reorganisation 
is also explored by Gertner and Scharfstein (1991). They consider a model of a 
financially distressed firm with bank and public debt and focus on the investment 
inefficiencies that arise in reorganisation due to co-ordination problems among public 
debtholders. Berglof and von Thadden (1994) also look at a firm with a complex debt 
structure and show that firms can use multiple creditors with different types of debt 
to commit to optimal ex post termination. If liquidation values are low, it is optimal 
that short-term and long-term claims be held by separate investors, and short-term 
claims be secured. This arrangement strengthens the ex post bargaining position of 
the short-term lenders and diminishes the firm’s incentives to default strategically. 
Repullo and Suarez (1998) characterise the circumstances under which a mixture of
4In the paper this situation arises when creditors holding the same belief about the future cash­
flow of the firm value securities received in reorganisation differently due to different opportunity 
costs of funds or different tax rates, for example. If securities issued by the reorganised firm cannot 
be easily traded, they will not end up in the hands of those that value them the most and voting 
becomes less informative of creditors’ private information about the firm.
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informed (bank) and uninformed (market) finance is optimal and explain why bank 
debt is typically secured, senior, and tightly held, taking into account that banks 
can credibly threaten to liquidate a firm. This issue is also explored by Park (2000) 
that, in addition, endogenises the monitoring incentives of lenders. Finally, Rajan and 
Winton (1995) look at the role of covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor in 
the context of the optimal design of debt contracts.
This chapter does not address many of these issues, namely those related to secu­
rity design, but focuses instead on the renegotiation game itself and explicitly looks 
at the role of information asymmetries between creditors, considers a more realistic 
structure to the renegotiation game and clearly models co-ordination problems among 
multiple creditors.
On the technical side, this chapter is related to the rapidly growing literature on 
global games. Morris and Shin (2002) provide an overview stressing methodological 
issues and several applications can be found in Morris and Shin (2001) on the pricing 
of debt, Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) on bank runs and Rochet and Vives (2001) on 
banks’ liquidity crises.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2 presents the model, 
section 4.3 characterises the equilibrium of the simultaneous game and studies the 
properties of this equilibrium; section 4.4 looks at the sequential game and section 
4.5 derives some policy implications and concludes the chapter.
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4.2 The M odel
4 .2 .1  T h e Fram ew ork
The general structure of the model is as follows. Time is divided into two periods, 
t — 0 and 1 and the risk-free rate is normalised to zero. There are two types of risk- 
neutral agents: a firm (or manager-owner of the firm) and its creditors. There are two 
classes of creditors with a total claim of D  on the firm: a large creditor (she) holds a 
position on the firm with face value B , and the remainder is held by a continuum [0,1] 
of small bondholders, each holding an identical claim with face value b. The firm has a 
fixed-scale investment project that should have matured at the beginning of period 0, 
but due to unforeseen circumstances it will take an extra period to generate monetary 
cash-flows. Hence, at the beginning of period 0, the firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer to creditors to exchange their loans in return for a equity claim on the firm to 
be paid in the following period (like a debt-for-equity exchange offer)5. Investors can 
therefore individually choose whether to call in (withdraw) their loans or accept the 
exchange offer made by the firm.
The chapter considers a renegotiation set-up that is common practice in exchange 
offers: the large creditor and a minimum  proportion of creditors are required to 
accept the firm’s offer6. The proportion of small creditors that withdraw their claims 
is defined as u  G [0,1] and 1 — u) € [0.5,1) is the minimum proportion of creditors 
required to accept the plan.
All initial debt is collateralised, hence if more than 1 — Q creditors and/or the 
large creditor disagree with the plan, the firm is liquidated and all creditors receive
5In reality, this happens quite frequently. See for example, Brown et. al (1993) and James (1995).
Alternatively, assume that bank debt is so large that withdrawal by the bank implies immediate 
failure.
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the liquidation value: the large creditor receives L, whereas each individual small 
debtholders i is entitled to I, where =  LVq — L  and LVq stands for liquidation
i
value at time 0.
If the exchange offer goes through, the game continues to period 1. Small creditors 
that have decided to withdraw their claims are paid b. The lenders that decide to 
exchange their loans (including the large lender) receive the new claim proposed by 
the firm7 provided that the project succeeds. The project’s success depends on the 
realisation of the random variable 6 that is known by the firm at the beginning of 
period 1. In order to generate 6, the firm needs to incur a cost K . This cost measures 
the reward expected by the firm as a compensation for the disutility of effort required 
to manage the project successfully. Hence, if the firm does not contribute K , and this 
happens whenever 6 is not high enough to compensate the firm after creditors have 
been paid8, the project is worthless. In this case, the firm is liquidated and creditors 
share the liquidation value at time 1, LV\ that simply equals zero.
The following table summarises the small creditors’ payoffs under the different 
scenarios: __________________________________________
U S  and N D S  and D
Accept Offer I ab 0
Withdraw Claim I b b
where ND stands for ”no default” , D stands for ’’default” , and S and U for ’’successful” 
and ’’unsuccessful” renegotiation respectively and a  >  1. The large creditor receives
7If it is credible that a group of numerous and uncoordinated creditors, with little or no bargaining 
power, would accept such a proposal put forward by the firm and would not demand a higher payoff 
for accepting to renegotiate. But it would not be difficult to assume that a large bank would exert 
its bargaining power and try to extract the best deal possible from the firm (cf. Raj an (1992)). For 
simplicity, the paper abstracts from this issue at this stage.
Alternatively, the residual payoff (by priority of claims rules) to the manager-owner of the firm 
has to be at least K .
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a B  in case renegotiation and project succeed.
For simplicity, it is assumed that if accepting the exchange offer yields the same 
expected payoff as withdrawing the loan, then a creditor prefers to withdraw.
The firm’s investment opportunity returns a stochastic cash flow of 0 in period 
1, which has an (improper) uniform prior over the real line. However, in order to 
finish the project the firm needs to obtain refinancing from new lenders (or otherwise 
forego economies of scale) to cover for the withdrawals of funding of those lenders 
that decide to reject the exchange offer. The marginal cost of an outflow of funds is 
k , where k =  akb and > a. Such cost may reflect the fact that the new creditors 
require a mark-up to refinance the firm, or that the firm incurs in a extra cost to find 
new financiers. Alternatively, it can result from the use of more expensive sources of 
financing such as trade credit or over-drafts. Hence the firm’s payoff from continuation 
is 6 — a B  — ab — u ( k  — ab), where the last term is negative and indicates the extra 
cost a firm has to bear due to creditors’ withdrawals.
As a consequence, the value of the firm at maturity depends on two factors: the 
randomly determined fundamental state 6 and the severity of the extra cost k — ab 
caused by withdrawal of creditors.
As in Morris and Shin (2001) creditors have the option to withdraw their funds or 
accept the new offer put forward by the firm but in this model creditors vote on the 
reorganisation plan. Contrarily to their paper, there is a large creditor and the firm is 
allowed to continue as extra funds are injected on it but this generates an extra cost 
that affects the probability of failure in the last period (cf. Figure 4.1 and 4.2).
The model is also closely related to Hubert and Schafer (2001) but they compare 
the situation of multiple bondholders to the case of a single lender and do not analyse 
the effects of a more complex debt structure that combines the two types of debt.
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Creditors act
Project fails Project does not fail 
Figure 4.1: Morris and Shin (2001) game.
Creditors vote on reorganisation
Reorganisation succeeds
Reorganisation fails
Firm defaults Firm does not default 
Figure 4.2: Game with extra stage.
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The element of formal voting is also absent from their paper.
To summarise, the timing of the events is as follows:
• Period 0: The firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to creditors. Creditors ob­
serve private signals on 6 and vote on the offer. If the voting is successful, 
creditors who choose to withdraw receive 6; if unsuccessful, the firm is liqui­
dated.
•  Period 1: The firm observes 6 and decides whether to incur the cost K . If so 
new funds are injected in the firm. The project matures and yields a return 6. 
Creditors remaining with the firm are paid the new claim.
4 .2 .2  T h e In form ation  S tru ctu re
In order to make an informed voting decision, creditors obtain an (imperfect) signal 
about the firm. Each creditor i receives a noisy private signal:
X i  =  0  +  GEi
revealing some information about the fundamentals, where £* is normally distributed 
with mean zero and unit variance (and density /  (.) and c.d.f. F  (.)) and a >  0 is a 
constant. The noise terms are i.i.d. across creditors.
The large creditor observes the realisation of the random variable:
y =  0 +  tt)
where r  > 0 is a constant and rj is a normally distributed random variable with mean 
zero and unit variance (and density /  (.) and c.d.f. F  (.)) and each £i is independent
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of 7]. The distributions of the fundamentals and private signals are assumed to be 
known by all participants.
Note that in the last stage failure will occur if K  > 9—a B —ab—u  (k — ab). Hence, 
if creditors know the value of 9 perfectly before deciding on whether to accept the 
exchange offer and there is no voting, the decision is trivial. If 9 > K  -1- a B  + k = 9, 
then it is optimal to continue the project irrespective of the actions of the other 
creditors. Conversely, if 9 < K  +  a B  +  ab =  9, failure is certain no m atter what 
the other lenders do. However, because there is a voting requirement, the project 
proceeds if and only if u  or fewer creditors withdraw their funding. Hence, if exactly 
1 — uj creditors renegotiate 9 needs to exceed K  + a B  + ab + u)(k — ab) =  9 for the 
project to succeed. Otherwise, the firm defaults for sure. It is the intermediate range 
9 G ^0,9 that is critical. Hence, the firm’s success depends on the action of its 
debtholders.
W ith imperfect information, agents form a posterior about the level of the fun­
damentals in period 1. Since Xi is normally distributed, a creditor i posterior of 9 
upon observing signal x { is normal with mean and precision Xi and a respectively. 
In equilibrium, every small creditor follows the switching strategy around the critical 
value x*. The large creditor, on the other hand, follows a switching strategy around
V*-
Therefore, a creditor’s strategy is a rule of action which maps each realisation 
of her signal to one of the actions - to accept the exchange offer or to withdraw 
the loan. The equilibrium is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which, conditional on 
each creditor’s signal, the action prescribed by this creditor maximises her conditional 
expected payoff when all other creditors follow their strategies in equilibrium.
I l l
4.3 Equilibrium of the Simultaneous Move Game
Using the global games methodology, the agents follow a switching strategy around a 
certain posterior belief. Given this posterior belief the number of agents that accept 
reorganisation is determined. Additionally, the critical next period value of the fun­
damentals for which the firm will default is computed and depends on the belief in 
this period which makes agents switch. When deciding whether to switch, creditors 
compute what happens if there is continuation and this is then compared with what 
results from liquidation. There are three equations and three unknowns that define 
the unique equilibrium of the game.
It is also important to point out that in this game there are no global strategic 
complementarities. This property requires that an agent’s incentive to take an action 
increases with the number of other agents taking that same action. This property 
does not hold in this model since when the proportion of creditors that withdraws is 
between Q and 1, the effect on the incentive to withdraw of an individual creditor is 
constant as renegotiation is going to be unsuccessful and regardless of what he does a 
creditor always receives the liquidation value. Only when less than Q withdraw does 
the game exhibits strategic complementarities. Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) prove 
that in such a setting there are one-sided strategic complementarities and show that 
the equilibrium is still unique and in switching strategies.
4 .3 .1  F irm ’s D efa u lt P o in t and E x -a n te  P ro b a b ility  o f  a Suc­
cessfu l R en eg o tia tio n
It is initially conjectured tha t all agents optimally follow a trigger strategy: they 
accept the offer if and only if their signal is above some optimally selected threshold
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x* for bondholders and y* for the large creditor respectively; otherwise they withdraw 
their loan. It is later shown that in fact the unique equilibrium of this game is 
characterised by a critical value 9*, for which the project is on the margin of success 
and failure, and a critical value for the signals x* and y*. Given this, conditional on 
state 9, the distribution of x  is normal with mean 9 and variance a2. So the ex-ante 
probability that any agent refuses reorganisation is equal to
* — 9 \
— )  • (4 1 )
As the number of agents tends to infinity9, the proportion of agents that reject reor­
ganisation is deterministic and will be equal to this ex-ante probability by the Law 
of Large Numbers (see Judd(1985)). Therefore, when deciding whether to agree with 
renegotiation a small creditor not only takes into account how the other players are 
going to vote (and that they also follow a trigger strategy) but is also able to an­
ticipate precisely the proportion of small creditors that votes for reorganisation. For 
this reason, even if voting is not binding, agents do not want to revise their decisions 
based on the outcome of the voting stage.
The default point 6* is such that the expected profit of the firm is equal to zero 
and it is implicitly given by the following expression:
6* = K  +  a B  +  ab +  u  ( x \  9*) (k -  ab) . (4.2)
The right-hand side of (4.2) represents the firm’s liabilities and the left hand side the 
firm’s assets in period 1 after paying its creditors. Substituting (4.1) evaluated at 9*
9And this is what happens here in the case of small creditors that are continuously distributed 
in the interval [0,1].
u  (x *, 9) = Pr (xi < x* | 9) = F
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in (4.2), the first equilibrium condition is derived as:
V - y W - g - q B - q  6
a J k — ab
On the other hand, if the true state is 0, the proportion of players observing a signal 
lower than x* is F  ( ~ ^ ) .  Renegotiation is successful if u  < Q, that is equivalent to 
F  < cD or rearranging, 0 > x* — crF-1 (cD) =  0. Thus, the probability that a
player assigns a proportion lower than u  of the other players observing a signal lower 
than x *, if he has observed x* is defined as
Pr (u < u  | x*) =  1 — Pr (0 < x* — crF~l (tD) | x*) = Q. (4.4)
This result implies that the density will be uniform and it depends on the fact that 
6 follows an improper prior10.
4 .3 .2  Large C red itor S w itch in g  P o in t
If the large creditor disagrees renegotiation will automatically fail. If she agrees, rene­
gotiation succeeds if more than 1 —Q bondholders agree with the renegotiation plan. 
This is in line with the empirical evidence that asserts that a firm in financial dis­
tress does generally restructure all outstanding debt. In fact, Gilson, John and Lang 
(1990) state that 90.0 percent of firms in the sample with bank debt (large creditor) 
outstanding, and 69.8 percent of firms with publicly traded debt, do restructure that 
particular type of debt.
She knows that, given the small creditors switching point x*, if 6 < 0, renegotia­
10See Morris and Shin (2002b) for a detailed discussion of this result.
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tion is unsuccessful because a proportion lower than 1 — u  of small creditors decides 
to accept renegotiation, regardless of the large creditor’s actions. In this case, the 
firm is liquidated and the large creditor receives the liquidation payoff L. If a propor­
tion higher than 1 — Q accepts the renegotiation package, renegotiation is successful 
provided that large creditor agrees. Note that the signals x  and y are independent, 
therefore the large creditor needs to take into account the probability that the small 
creditors renegotiate given the small creditor’s switching point x*. But even if rene­
gotiation is indeed successful, only when 6 > 6* does the firm not default in the 
last period and only then the large creditor receives olB .  Refusal to renegotiate by 
the large creditor results in liquidation and a payoff of L. Thus, the large creditor 
restructures her debt, conditional on small creditors’ acceptance when,
P r f#  < 0 | x*) L  +  P r {d > 0* | y*) Pr ($ > 6, \ a B  =  L
or
Rearranging the expression, it can be written as follows:
The second equilibrium condition determines the level of y* such that the large creditor 
restructures her debt if her signal is above y*, and does not restructure otherwise. The
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threshold y* is defined as follows:
Note that 9* is in fact a function of x*, and x* depends on the large creditor’s switching 
point y*.
4 .3 .3  Sm all C red itors S w itch in g  P o in t
Consider now a small creditor’s problem: he knows that for 9 < 9, renegotiation 
is unsuccessful, regardless of the large creditor’s actions and in this case the firm 
is liquidated and he receives his share of the liquidation value, I. If 9 € (o, 9* , 
renegotiation is successful provided that the large creditor agrees to renegotiate 11 but 
the firm defaults. In this case, a small creditor that accepted renegotiation receives 
zero but and he would have received 6, had he withdrawn his funds from the firm. 
If 9 > 9* the project succeeds when the large creditor agrees to renegotiate. A 
small creditor that remains with the firm receives ab and he would have received b 
otherwise. Since a small creditor’s optimal strategy is to continue lending if and only 
if his expected payoff from continuing lending conditional on x  exceeds his payoff from 
stopping lending, the switching point x* equates the payoff when a creditor consents 
to the payoff when he refuses12:
Pr (e  < 6 I a;*) l +  P r ( e  < e < e \ y  < y* I z * )/ +  Pr ($ < 6 < 6*,y >  y* \ x*)  0
Pr (9 > 9 * ,y < y * \  x*) I +  Pr (6 > 9*, y > y* \ x*) ab
11 And this happens when her private signal y  exceeds the switching point y*.
12This possibly excessive notation will be useful later on.
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=  Pr (e  < e I x ' \  Z +  P r (0 <  0 < 0 ',y  < y* | x*) / +  P r(0  > 6 * ,y < y *  \ x*)l 
+  P r ^ e < e < e \ y > y •  | x*) 6 +  P r(0  > 6 \ y > y * \  x*)6 
that can be simplified to
Pr (0 > 0*,y > y* \ x*) a  = Pr (d > 6, y > y* \ x* j^
and re-written as 13:
/ (^) (■ -' O^O)—/ (^) (> -' (^)) «•
0* $
(4.6)
Creditors receive a sure amount b if renegotiation is successful but they withdraw 
their loans whereas acceptance of the firm’s offer confers a risky output, ab or 0.
There is a unique x* that solves this equation. In order to simplify this expression 
it is helpful to introduce a change of variables in the integrals. Let
6 - x 'z  = -------
and denote
- e -  x* ~= 0* -  x*
0 =  and 0 = ---------
a
13Note that Pr (9 >  6*,y >  y* \ x*) is the joint probability of no default and renegotiation by 
the large creditor given x* and the probability that the large creditor renegotiates for a given 6 is 
P r (y> y*  =
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and using (4.5), the expression can be rewritten as (see Appendix for details):
+00/ / ( * )  ( i - f ( ^ - z ) - f - 1 ( i - A ) ) ) dza
<5
+00
= /  /  (*) ( i  -  F  ( ^  (J -  *) -  F -  ( l  -  A ) ) )  *  (4.7)
6
Note that 8 and 8 are invariant and strictly decreasing in x*u  respectively, since
,  dS 1- — = 0 and - — =  — ----------— 7=r------ < 0.
dx* dx* (k - a b ) f  ( 8 ) + a
Both sides of (4.7) are continuous and strictly increasing in x*. Hence, as a  —► 1, the 
RHS is always higher than the LHS for any x* but both converge to the same value 
as x* increases (as 6 decreases and approaches 8). Consequently, as a  increases, the 
LHS suffers a parallel upward shift and there will be a unique solution to (4.7) when 
both sides cross. The higher the a , the lower the value of x* that satisfies expression
(4.7). This makes sense as a higher payoff from accepting the exchange-offer makes 
it the optimal choice for a higher number of creditors.
Also note that the optimal x* decreases with the relative precision of private 
information of the small and the large creditors, J , and with the voting requirement 
established by the firm. On the other hand, the payoff received in case of liquidation, 
i.e., the value of the collateral backing up the initial claim does not affect the decision 
to renegotiate. This happens because a small creditor receives I, when the exchange 
offer does not succeed, independently of how he voted before and the vote of an
14By total differentiating £(.) and S(.) and using expression (4.3).
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individual small creditor is not pivotal.
In contrast, looking at the large creditor equilibrium condition, a higher L  makes 
her acceptance of the renegotiation plan more difficult and this increases if her pri­
vate signal becomes less precise. When she is perfectly informed, i.e. r  —> 0, then 
y* —> 6* and the large creditor rejects renegotiation when the firm defaults and agrees 
to renegotiate otherwise. As r  increases, the switching point y* increases: she be­
comes more conservative and acceptance of renegotiation happens for higher levels of 
her private signal. But this only happens if L  is high enough15. For example, if L  is 
equal to zero, the large creditor always renegotiate for any positive r , whereas having 
something (high enough) to lose in case of liquidation makes the laxge creditor more 
cautious and use her private information when deciding on whether to renegotiate. 
Moreover, this result depends crucially on the fact that the large creditor is pivotal. 
This is in line with the fact that bank debt (large creditor) is often senior and col­
lateralised (cf. Mann(1997) and Schwartz(1997)) and public debt is in general junior 
and uncollateralised. Small creditors do not use the value of the collateral (liquidation 
value) when deciding whether to renegotiate. On the other hand, the value of the 
collateral forces the large creditor to be careful when considering whether to agree 
with renegotiation and in doing she makes use of her private information. But note 
that this is beneficial if large creditors are well-informed institutions. If not, this gen­
erates excessive failures to renegotiate as the switching point y* becomes increasingly 
higher. In addition, as Rajan (1992) demonstrates this potential benefit has to be 
weighed against the monopoly bargaining power of the single lender derived from its 
monitoring function16.
15The function F -1 (l — ^ )  is negative when L >
16This model is based on the assumption that the large creditor/bank is benevolent and does not 
try to extract more money from the firm. Of course the bank could try to behave in an opportunistic
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Some other results can be analysed by focusing on the limiting cases of the relative 
precision of private information, i.e. by letting agents become arbitrarily well informed 
about the fundamentals. The empirical evidence and the theoretical literature on this 
area seem to agree with the fact that large creditors are in general better informed than 
small creditors. Hence, the focus is now on the case in which the large player is more 
informed than the rest of the market and has arbitrarily precise private information, 
that is lim ^ =  00. In this case, the probability that the large creditor renegotiates 
when the firm defaults from the small creditors’ point of view is
Pr {0 < 6 * ,y > y *  \ x*)
and, given the information structure of the game and the definition of the large creditor 
signal, i.e.,
y  =  X i - ( T £ i  +  TT)
and
this probability can be expressed as
Pr ( e t > ~ <>£> > 9* -  x ’ -  r F ”1 ( l  -  .
way and renegotiate a higher a. This would have to be made public in the reorganisation plan and 
the bank would therefore reveal her information to the remaining creditors. This is just equivalent 
to the model developed in the next section where the bank moves first. The optimal thing for the 
bank to do would be to extract the maximum after small creditors and the firm are paid. The bank 
would still act as a co-ordination device but at a higher cost for the firm’s shareholders.
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When lim  ^ =  oo (or lim -  =  0) the probability can be rewritten as,
x* -6 *  t  0* - x *  r  , /  L
---------------- F  I 1 -------—Pr [ S i  > ---------- , - r j - £ i >  - i -  Da a  a a \  a n
and it is simply equal to
x* -  0* 0* -  x*
Pr U j > ---------- , - S i  >
G
that is just equal to zero. Hence, small creditors believe that when the large cred­
itor is a.s. (almost surely) perfectly informed, she does not renegotiate for values 
of the fundamentals where the firm defaults. Consequently if renegotiation suc­
ceeds there is no default. Thus, given that the large creditor does not renegotiate 
Pr(0 <  0*,y < y* | x*) equals Pr (0 < 0* | x*) and the small creditor indifference con­
dition is modified as follows:
<5 + oo
J  f  (z) dzl +  I  f ( z )  ( l - f ( ^ ( S - z) - F - 1 ( l  -  A ) ) ) ^ a
- 0 0  s
5 + oo
=  J  f { z ) d z l +  J  f ( z )  ( l - f ( ^ ( S - z) - F - 1 ( i - A ) ) ) ^ .
— 0 0  s
If 0 > 0* (that is, for any z > 8) the probability that a precisely informed large player 
chooses to renegotiate is equal to one and the probability of a successful renegotiation 
is precisely equal to the probability of successful renegotiation on the small creditors’ 
group only. In other words, if the large creditor is very well informed there is no 
uncertainty on her side only on the small creditor side and the expression for the
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switching point becomes
J  f  (z) dza  =  J  f ( z ) d z
s 5
which means that small creditors always renegotiate, i.e., x* —> —oo. Expression (4.2) 
defines the default point:
These results are summarised in the following proposition17:
P ro p o sitio n  14. When J  —► oo; there is a unique trigger equilibrium where small 
creditors always agree to renegotiate and the level of fundamentals that implies default 
by the firm and indifference between accepting and rejecting renegotiation by the large 
creditor are:
Basically, small creditors have nothing to lose by accepting to renegotiate because 
if the firm is going to default, the large creditor does not renegotiate and this implies 
immediate liquidation. This is the case because liquidation produces the same payoff 
to all small creditors independently of the direction of their vote. Also, the voting
17Morris and Shin (2001) also prove in a similar model that this is the only equilibrium that 
survives iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
6* —► K  -f a B  +  ab
and the switching point of the large creditor is derived from (4.5):
6* —> K  + a B  +  ab
and
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requirement does not play any role in this case.
As the noise goes to zero, i.e. the large creditor becomes more confident about the 
information content of her signal, y* —> 6*. Also, although the precision of the large 
creditor’s private signal, rather then her size, was fundamental to derive the small 
creditor’s switching point, size does have an impact precisely on the trigger point of 
the large creditor. Given that the sum of the firm’s total claims is equal to D , an 
increase in B  implies a reduction in b. Hence, ^  =  0 and =  —r  ~ ^ §2
and is always negative: the higher the claim from the large creditor relative to small 
creditors, the lower her switching point and the easier it is for her to accept renego­
tiation.
It is interesting to compare the previous limiting case with the case where 7 —► 0, 
i.e. the case where the large creditor is less informed. This might be implausible if 
the large creditor is a bank but can be the case if the large creditor is instead a pool 
of uniformly uninformed creditors. When taking the limit, because the probability 
that the large creditor renegotiates is constant, (4.7) becomes:
The switching point is therefore implicitly given by the following expression:





three unknowns that completely characterise the equilibrium in this limiting case. 
The system yields a closed form solution such as:
P ro p o sitio n  15. When 7 —► 0, there is a unique trigger equilibrium with:
u ( k  — ctb)
e* -+ K  + olB  +  ab +
a
x K  + a B  + ab + ^ ^  -  o-F"1 (1  -
a \  a  J
and
y ' -> K  + a B  + a b + ^ — ^ - r F -1 ( l - \
a \  a B
The result is quite different from the previous case. When small creditors decide 
whether to renegotiate the large creditor only plays a role through 0*. This happens 
because it is assumed that all different debt classes need to agree with the plan and 
the probability that the large creditor renegotiates is constant. Moreover, the voting 
requirement now plays a role.
Before the analysis of the comparative statics in this case, it is worth looking at 
the case where there is no voting requirement.
4 .3 .4  N o  V otin g  R eq u irem en ts
This is simply the case where voting takes place but the firm does not set a majority 
requirement, i.e. Q =  1. If the firm does not impose voting requirements than there is 
no forced liquidation unless the large creditor decides not to renegotiate18, but on the 
other hand, there is no upper limit on the amount of funds that need to be replaced 
at a cost when the existing small creditors foreclose. The ” no-renegotiation point” is
18The case where the large creditor is not pivotal is discussed below.
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now 9, i.e. it the point such that the level of fundamentals is lower than K  + a.B + ab: 
even if all creditors accept to exchange their claims the firm defaults. This point is 
lower than 9, i.e, the threshold point that determines default when 1 — w creditors 
agree with renegotiation. Making the same change of variable as before:
ro = ---------,cr
hence the expression (4.7) is modified as follows,




The RHS of (4.9) is always higher than the RHS of (4.7) (because 6 is lower than 0), 
hence, agreeing to renegotiate becomes more difficult. Thus, a higher x* is needed for 
indifference (remember the LHS of (4.9) is increasing in x*). As ^ —► oo, x* —► —oo 
as before and the equilibrium coincides with the corresponding equilibrium discussed 
above (Proposition 14). However, when J  —► 0, x* can be defined as
X* =  6* -  <tF-1 ( i  -  | )  ,
and
-77 7, , k — ab9* = K  + a B  + ab-\----------- .
a
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Finally, the thresholds y* and x* become:
y* =  K  +  aB  +  ab +  -  r F ’ 1 (1 -  - L )
a \  a B )
and
x* =  K  +  a B  +  a b  +  k ~ a b  -  <tF_1 f  1 -  -  Va \  a  J
The comparison with the results derived in Proposition 15 is performed below.
4 .3 .5  C om p arative S ta tics
This subsection looks at the comparative statics of the equilibrium levels, 6*, x* and 
y*, of the simultaneous game where small creditors are better informed than the large 
creditor, derived in Proposition 15. Looking at the expressions for the equilibrium 
values, 6* increases with the cost related parameters K  and k. A higher a  decreases 
6* by increasing the number of creditors that accept renegotiation but 0* needs to 
increase to meet the higher claims to be paid next period to the creditors that remain 
on the firm. The overall effect is negative if k is high enough (see the Appendix for 
more details). A more lenient voting requirement also means that renegotiation is 
more likely to succeed but at a higher cost of replacing funds. Hence, it increases 
the default point, although this effect is lower the lower k and the higher a  are: as k 
decreases the cost of replacing the creditors that withdraw decreases and an increase 
in a  discourages withdrawal of funds from the firm.
The equilibrium level of the switching point for the large creditor19 changes with 
6* and from the extra term the same as in the previous limiting case can be concluded
19That is simply y* =  0* — t F ~1 ( l — ^ ) .
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about the role of seniority in bank debt.
The switching point x*20 is also affected by the way 6* changes and, even taking 
into account the extra term, x* still increases with a more lenient voting requirement. 
This effect is exacerbated for higher values of a: as creditors’ opinions become more 
dispersed the co-ordination effect of the voting requirement becomes stronger. In the 
no voting requirement case, i.e., in the case where there is no public debt voting on the 
reorganisation plan, x* is always higher or equal than when a voting requirement is 
imposed by the firm, regardless of the relative precision of private information between 
the two groups of creditors. From this it can be concluded that the existence of a 
voting requirement does act as a co-ordination device. But some caution should be 
exerted in order not to set a requirement so high that makes renegotiation impossible. 
Setting it too low means that extra funds need to be borrowed at a higher cost.
The effect of a  in x* and y* is still ambiguous but it can be said that the change 
in x* is lower than the change in 6* (see Appendix for details).
The effect of the large creditor size in this case is also different from before (see 
the Appendix for more details). The default point 6* increases with B. A higher 
claim to the large creditor is equivalent to a lower claim to each small creditor so this 
effect cancels out as before. But in this case there is an additional effect: a lower 
claim for each small creditor, means that there is less to gain from gambling which 
implies that the number of creditors that renegotiate decreases and the failure point 
increases. This increase is higher the higher k is.
The effect on x* is exactly the same but the effect on y* is ambiguous. It depends 
on which effect dominates: the one related to 0* or the one that is linked to the 
precision of information. As the precision increases (i.e., r  decreases) the effect of 6*
20That is defined as x* =  6* — crF-1 (l — ^)
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becomes more important and ^  increases. This effect is obvious as the higher the 
large creditor debt the higher the fundamentals required to repay it.
4.4 Discussion
4 .4 .1  E qu ilibrium  o f th e  S eq u en tia l M ove G am e
Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) find evidence that banks are reluctant to bear 
the full cost of a reorganisation. James (1995) find that for firms with public debt 
outstanding, banks never make concessions unless public debtholders also restructure 
their claims. Hence, since banks rarely make unilateral concessions, how does the 
announcement of the large creditor decision to renegotiate affects the behaviour of 
small creditors?
By agreeing to renegotiate, a well-informed large creditor signals that, based on 
her (more precise) information, she finds the fundamentals to be strong. The result is 
similar to the simultaneous game and in the limit there is acceptance of the exchange 
offer by all the firm’s small creditors independently of their private signals and of the 
value and terms of the exchange offer made by the firm. But there is a difference 
between the two cases: the result of the simultaneous depends on the fact that liq­
uidation gives the same payoff to a small creditor that agrees with renegotiation and 
to a small creditor that refuses to renegotiate 21, whereas this is not necessary in the 
sequential case.
The large creditor claim, that can be interpreted as a bank loan, acts as a disci­
plining device on the firm because default allows this creditor to exercise the option
21 It can be argued that in some circumstances these payoffs might not be the same: rejecting 
the renegotiation plan might mean ” doing nothing” but accepting it might entail costs in terms of 
time/effort to attend creditors’ meetings or can even include legal costs.
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to force the firm into liquidation and generates information useful to all the remaining 
and less informed creditors. The agreement by a better informed creditor to rene­
gotiate, even though her debt might be senior and secured and she would be able 
recoup her investment in case of liquidation, provides a strong signal to the remaining 
creditors and constitutes a strong co-ordination device. Hence,
P ro p o s itio n  16. When 7 —► oo and the large creditor announces she agrees to rene­
gotiate there is a unique trigger equilibrium with
Large creditor’s refusal to renegotiate leads to liquidation.
Proof: See Appendix.
If the large creditor is less informed than small creditors, the problem is also similar 
to the case of simultaneous renegotiation when 7 —* 00. Because small creditors are 
better informed, the large creditor’s decision is not taken into account on the small 
creditor’s decision to renegotiate. Therefore,
P ro p o s itio n  17. When 7 —► 0, there is a unique trigger equilibrium that coincides 
with the one in the simultaneous game.
Proof: See Appendix.
x  —> —00
6 —» K  +  olB  +  ab
and
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Obviously, if small creditors move first and are precisely informed, whereas the 
large creditor’s private information is noisy, the large creditor mimics the result of the 
voting stage where small creditors follow a trigger strategy. If they are worse informed 
than a well-informed large creditor they choose as in the equivalent simultaneous 
game: all small creditors agree with the renegotiation package proposed by the firm 
and wait for the large and well-informed to decide on the renegotiation outcome. This 
happens because the large creditor is pivotal and without her approval renegotiation 
does not succeed.
4 .4 .2  Large C red itor not P iv o ta l
In reality, when a firm seeks to renegotiate its debt it is common that all different types 
of debt claims are affected. Thus, the firm usually proposes a renegotiation package 
that needs to be approved by all classes of creditors. Since bank debt (represented 
by the large creditor) and bonds (represented by small creditors) belong to different 
classes, it was assumed throughout this chapter that the large creditor was pivotal in 
renegotiation. When this assumption is relaxed and the large creditor is not pivotal 
for the success of the reorganisation game but only a critical majority of all creditors 
is needed, her role as a coordination device is obviously weakened. Consider the case 
where the large creditor is perfectly informed. In subsection 4.3.3. it was derived that 
small creditors would always agree to renegotiate and let the large creditor determine 
the outcome of the renegotiation game. However, now if all small creditors agree but 
the large creditor refuses to renegotiation, renegotiation is successful and the firm 
continues to period 1. Before small creditors ignored their private information and 
relied on the large creditor but they cannot afford to do so if the large creditor is not
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pivotal. Since small creditors take into account their private information, creditors 
with low private signals are not going to participate in renegotiation and only creditors 
that are optimistic enough about the firm are going to agree with the renegotiation 
package. Hence, the switching point x* is no longer —oo but is instead a positive 
finite value the large creditor participates in reorganisation for a high enough level of 
the private signal.
The simultaneous game where small creditors are better informed is also going 
to change. In subsection 4.3.3 small creditors decided whether to renegotiate based 
on their private information but taking into account that the large creditor would 
also have to agree for renegotiation to succeed. If the large creditor is not pivotal, 
the switching point is going to increase because small creditors need to bear in mind 
that if the large creditors does not participate in renegotiation, extra (and more 
expensive) funds need to be raised in case renegotiation succeeds22. Thus, the firm 
needs to generate a higher outcome to avoid default in the last period of the game. 
Consequently, small creditors renegotiate for higher levels of the private signals about 
the project’s outcome.
In the sequential game, the less informed class always mimics the more informed 
one, if the latter moves first and whether or not each class is pivotal for renegotiation. 
If the class that moves first is uninformed, for example, if small creditors are unin­
formed and move first, they can no longer rely on the large creditor to determine the 
outcome of renegotiation. Hence, they start taking into account their private signals 
in their decision to renegotiate.
22All funds that are withdrawn from the firm need to be replaced, including the funds withdrawn 
by the large creditor
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4.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter studies the process of renegotiation between a firm and its claimants. 
More specifically, it focuses on the role of voting requirements that are widely attached 
to public debt restructurings and on the impact of a large creditor, for example a bank, 
in the restructuring of public debt. It also contrasts the outcome of reorganisation 
when the voting is simultaneous with what happens .when the large creditor’s decision 
is announced in advance.
Both the voting requirement and the relative precision of private information of 
the small and large creditors are found to affect the small creditors decision to rene­
gotiate. The key results can be explored by looking at limiting cases. Hence, when 
renegotiation takes place simultaneously and the large creditor is arbitrarily more 
informed than the remaining creditors and a.s. perfectly informed, small creditors al­
ways agree to renegotiate. This happens because renegotiation is successful if all debt 
classes agree with the renegotiation plan proposed by the firm. Thus, as liquidation 
provides small creditors with the same payoff independently of how they voted, they 
have nothing to lose by accepting to renegotiate as they believe the large creditor will 
not allow the firm to continue for it to default in the last period: they believe default 
will not occur if renegotiation succeeds. The voting requirement does not play a role 
in this case, however as small creditors become more informed relative to the large 
creditor, the more important the voting requirement is as a co-ordination device. In 
the opposite limiting case, a more lenient voting requirement is translated into an 
higher expected number of creditors foreclosing their claims which forces the firm to 
replace their claims by new and more expensive funds. However, the existence of 
voting requirements always facilitates renegotiation relative to the case where they
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are absent from the renegotiation process.
When the large creditor is able to signal her position by announcing that she 
agrees (or does not agree) to renegotiate before small creditors have voted on the 
renegotiation plan, the results from the limiting cases are very similar but more general 
than in the previous case. Before small creditors always agreed to renegotiate, and 
now they mimic the large creditor’s behaviour. Also in the previous case, perfect 
co-ordination requires the payoff from liquidation to be the same regardless of how a 
small creditor votes and in this case such a condition is not required.
These results suggest that the mix of private and public debt is an important 
determinant of a distressed firm’s ability to restructure out-of-court but it shows 
that a capital structure with multiple investors and different debt classes does not 
necessarily make renegotiation more difficult than with only one type of claim and 
provides an rationale for a diversified capital structure based on the informational 
role that some creditors might have in case of financial distress.
From a technical point of view, the results derived here differ significantly from 
the existing literature on global games with large and small players, as perfect co­
ordination of small players is usually closely related to the signalling role of the large 
player and in this model it happens even when the large player’s actions are not 




Firms and investors are in general asymmetrically informed. The role of financial 
certification intermediaries, such as audit firms and rating agencies, is to fill the 
informational gap between these two groups of agents. However, these intermediaries 
have their own objectives (they are profit maximisers or have reputational concerns, 
for example) which results in a misalignment of interests between them and the users 
of the information they collect and provide.
This thesis assesses to what extent their private interests interfere with their ob­
jective to mitigate asymmetries of information. This is particularly important in light 
of recent financial scandals and regulatory developments. For example, there are 
proposals to use ratings for regulatory purposes: the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision intends to see borrowers’ credit ratings included in assessments of the 
adequacy of bank’s capital. On the other hand, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act introduced 
a number of the reforms to auditing procedures and established, among other things, 
that partners of accounting companies supervising the external audit have to rotate 
regularly.
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Chapter two concludes that when an intermediary is concerned about reputation 
and there is asymmetric information about her ability, the intermediary may ignore 
private information and simply confirm investors’ opinions about a certain firm. How­
ever, and bearing in mind that there is an on-going debate about how competitive 
the rating industry should be, incentives to conform with public information are mit­
igated by competition but with ’’too much” competition intermediaries end up being 
always too lenient in their assessments.
And according to chapter three, the length of auditor tenure and the existence 
of private benefits do affect incentives to gather and disclose information. But on 
the other hand, longer tenures improve the activity of information collection and 
consequently auditor rotation might be beneficial in some circumstances or for some 
industries and not for others. Once more the Enron case provides an example for this: 
Enron expanded its activities from energy production to energy derivatives trading, 
but the task to audit the former is far easier than the more complex and specialised 
audits needed for a firm that does the latter.
In contrast to the previous two chapters, chapter four looks at asymmetric infor­
mation as a way to achieve a desirable outcome. In a situation where bondholders 
are voting for the reorganisation of a viable firm that will otherwise be liquidated, 
co-ordination problems might arise. But the existence of a large and more informed 
creditor can facilitate the reorganisation of public debt even if her decision on whether 
to renegotiate is not known in advance by the remaining creditors. Voting require­
ments can also act as co-ordination devices.
There are obviously many questions left unanswered. This thesis has not looked 
at the role of managers although it was assumed that managers were also interested 
in pursuing their own interests. One interesting project would be to explore the
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impact of recent measures that make managers liable for the accuracy of financial 
reports and to what extent this interferes with the quality of the work performed 
by certification intermediaries. Or for example, to look at the impact of auditing 
standards in earnings manipulation by managers and to how important are other 
variables such as competitiveness of a firm’s industry or managers career concerns.
Finally, it would also be interesting to assess whether the new regulatory regime 
that establishes mandatory rotation of auditors is going to restrain competition among 
auditors and if it will end up strengthening the oligopoly structure for audit services.
These are possible avenues for future research.
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A ppendix A  
Auxiliary Calculations for Chapter 
2
A .l Proof of Proposition 2
Similar steps to the ones used in Boot, Milbourn and Thakor (2002) are used to solve 
for the equilibrium.
A . 1.1 T h e E quilibrium  B eh av iou r o f th e  U n ta len ted  In ter­
m ed iary
Define r  G {Tg,Tb,Uq,Ub}  as the set of possible types, where T and U indicate 
talented or untalented, and G and B designate the signal received, e.g. Tg is a 
talented certification intermediary that received a good signal. The set of possible 
actions is binary: send a favourable report (mo) or send an unfavourable report (tub). 
Types Ug and/or Ub may randomise across these two actions depending on the value
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of the prior 9, but and TB prefer to follow a pure strategy where they always 
report their private signals. This is proved by identifying the mixed strategy for high 
and low values of 6 and by proving that the 6 ranges do not overlap.
(i) T ype  U # random ises for h igh  values of 9 : Let U s send with prob­
ability 7 and m# with probability 1 — 7 and assume that the remaining types follow 
their conjectured equilibrium strategies. The following equation should therefore hold 
as Ub should be indifferent between sending m# and m G
Pr (G | sB, U) F1 (aGG) +  P r (B  | sB, U) (aGB) = Fx (aB) +  Co- (A.l)
The expression becomes clearer by replacing (2.4), (2.7) and the different values 
for a i, that are a GG, a GB and a B and whose expressions are derived above, in (A.l). 
It is easily shown that the LHS of (A.l) is monotonically decreasing in 7 , while the 
RHS is monotonically increasing in 7 . Moreover, it can be showed that the equality 
in (A.l) can only hold for a interior 7 € (0,1) provided that 9 is sufficiently high.
Firstly, observe that at 7 =  0 the LHS exceeds the RHS provided that 9 is suffi­
ciently high. After straightforward manipulation the expression becomes
e9 ao£
s9 +  (1 — s) (1 — 9) 29 (o!o +  (1 — £) (1 — <^ o))
_  _______________ q?q(1 -  9)s_______________
29 (oo (1 — 9) +  (1 — Oo) (s9 +  (1 — e)  (1 — 9)))
In order for the LHS to exceed the RHS it is necessary that
(1 — 9) ( e 9  +  (1 — e)  (1 — 9)) (oq +  (1 — e) (1 — ao))
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<  £0 (#o (1 — 0) +  (1 — olo) ( e 6  +  (1 — e) (1 — 0))) ,  
and the expression can be simplified as follows
(1 -  20) (1 -  e) (a0 +  (1 -  e) (1 -  <*<,)) < 02 ((1 -  oo) (2e — 1) — (1 — er) ao) . (A.2)
Secondly, it can be proven that 0 needs to be higher than \  and more precisely higher 
than 1 — e. Noting that as e < \  the RHS of (A.2) is always negative, 1 — 20 needs 
to be negative to transform the LHS in a negative number and 0 needs to be high 
enough for the inequality to occur. But if 0 equals 1 — e the expression becomes
1 -  2e > (1 -  s f
and this is impossible since e <
Consequently, equality (A.l) requires that 7 > 0 provided that
eOaGG (7 =  0) a#  (7 =  0) _  _
00 K 2 6  ( e 8  +  (1 — e) (1 — 9 ) )  K  2 6  “  Cmax
Now, evaluate (A.l) at 7 =  1. It immediately follows that, independently of cq, the 
LHS of (A.l) is always smaller than the RHS as the expression simplifies to:
/ a 0£ \ (  eO \  £
\  20 /  \ e 0 +  (1 — e) (1 — 0) /  Co_K2 9
Thus, there exists 7 , with 0 < 7 < 1. Finally, the posterior beliefs about the cer­
tification intermediary need to satisfy a technical condition that ensures a s  < Q-gg 
and allows for the existence of a mixed strategy no m atter how arbitrarily small cq is 
(otherwise the RHS of (A.l) would always be higher for 0 < 7 < 1). This condition
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states that
1 -  e +  £7 <  (eO +  (1 -  e) (1 -  9)) (1 -  7 ) . (A.3)
(ii) Types Tg, Tj3 and Ug recommend according to their respective 
signals for high values of 9 : It can be easily shown that T# strictly prefers to 
follow her signal (i.e. send an unfavourable report) just by looking at the indifference 
condition (A.l) for Ub. Since p r(G \ sb,T) < pr(G | s b , U) and F\ (aGG) >  1^ {&gb) 
(because the fee Fi (o;i) is increasing in 07), Tb  has strictly less to gain from sending a 
favourable report than Ub. The remaining types, Tg and Ug, always send a favourable 
report as pr(C | sG,T) > p r(G \ sq, U) > pr(G | sb , U) > p r(G \ sb ,T )  by looking at
P r (G | sG, a) Fi (;a GG) +  P r (B  \ sG, a) Fx (aGB) -  Fx (aB) -  cq
and realising that it always exceeds
Pr (G | s b , a) Fi (cEgg) +  Pr (B \ sB, a) Fi (aGB) -  Fx (aB) -  Co-
(iii) Type U b randomises for low values of 6: For low values of 9, there are 
two cases: 9 > e (Case 1) and 9 < e (Case 2).
Case 1: This proof mirrors the previous arguments. Ug now sends an un­
favourable report with probability 7 when 9 in the interval (0,1) is sufficiently low, 
i.e.
Pr (G | sG, U) F\ (olgG) + Pr (B \ sG, U) Fx (ogb) =  1^ (qlb) ~  °o- (A-4)
As before (2.4), (2.7) and q^ b and Q.b (whose expressions are derived above) 
are used to rewrite expression (A.4). Following arguments similar to the previous
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case, it is shown that 0 < 7 < 1 provided that 9 is sufficiently low. It can be easily 
demonstrated that the LHS of (A.4) is monotonically increasing in 7 , while the RHS 
is monotonically decreasing in 7 . It needs to be shown that the equality in (A.4) can 
only hold for a interior 7 6 (0,1) provided that 9 is sufficiently low.
Firstly, observe that at 7 =  0 the RHS exceeds the LHS. After straightforward 
manipulation the expression becomes
ao£ (1 — s) 6
n-
29  (ao +  (1 — oto) (1 — £)) { \  — £) 6  +  e  {1 — 6)
_   Qq (1 -  6) £______
29 (a:o (1 — 6) +  (1 — cuo) {s9 +  (1 — £) (1 — 0)))
In order for the RHS to exceed the LHS it is necessary that
(1 — e) 6 (ao (1 — 6) +  (1 — o;o) (£d +  (1 — e) (1 — 6)))
<  (1 — 0 )  ( (1  — £)  6  +  £  (1 — 6 ) )  (a o  +  (1 — £■) (1 — <Xq) )  •
This expression can be simplified as
—6 2oto < (1 — 29) (cko +  (1 — (1 — # 0)) 5
and as ao +  (1 — ^) (1 — <^ o) > <^0 and ~92 < 1  — 20, the inequality is always satisfied
for relatively low values of 9 and always if 9 is lower than 1. Moreover, if 9 < £, the
equality is always satisfied for any values of the remaining parameters. Consequently, 
equality (A.4), requires that 7  >  0 provided that
(1 — g) d o t j g g  (7  — 0) 07? (7  =  0)
00 2 9 { ( l - £ ) 9  + £ ( l - 0 ) )  20 "max
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Now, evaluate (A.4) at 7 =  1. It follows that:
e (1 — e)6 aos (1 — 9)
K2 e ( i - s ) e  + s ( i - e )  = K2 6 { \ - e a<s) ~ c°
The LHS exceeds the RHS, regardless of co, if-
(l-e)fl a0(l-fl)
(1 — e) 9 +  e (1 — 9) (1 — Oolq)
Given that the LHS is increasing in 9, the RHS is decreasing in 9 and when 9 —» 1 the 
LHS exceeds the RHS and otherwise when 9 —> 0, for a given e and oto there exists 
a 9 lower than 1 such that the for 6 >9 the LHS exceeds the RHS and otherwise for 
9 <9. For example if 9 = the relationship holds for ao <  ^ -e )  •
Thus, if 9 is low enough there exists 7 such that 0 <  7 <  1, provided tha t cq < cmax. 
Finally, the posterior beliefs about the certification intermediary needs to satisfy a 
technical condition that ensures a B < Oqq and allows for the existence of a mixed 
strategy no m atter how arbitrarily small Co. This condition states that
(1 — e) (1 — 9) (l — 7) <  ((1 — e) 9 +  e (1 — 9)) 7 +  (e9 +  (1 — e) (1 — 9)) (A.5)
and is always satisfied for any values of the parameters.
C ase 2: When 9 < e the untalented certification intermediary is not hired in 
period 1 if her type is revealed at the end of period 0 or her fee simply equals zero 
(this does not happen for high values of 9 because it was shown before that ’’high 
values of 0” means higher than \) .  Ug now recommends rejection with probability 7 , 
and this is in the interior of (0,1) if 9 is sufficiently low. Firstly, observe that at 7 =  0 
the RHS exceeds the LHS provided that 9 is sufficiently low. After straightforward
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manipulation the expression becomes
/ f l - g ___________ Otoe___________\  /  ( l —e ) 0  \
\  26 26 (ao +  (1 — ao) (1 — g)) /  V (1 — g) 6 +  e (1 — 6 ) )
_  6 — £ a o s { l  — 6)
=  * ~ W  +  *28  (a0 ( l - 8 )  +  ( l -  ao) ((s8 +  (1 -  s) (1 -  6)))) ~  *
In order for the LHS to exceed the RHS it is necessary that
(6 — e) £ (1 — 6) (o;o +  (1 — ao) (1 — £)) (a o (1 — 0) +  (1 — £*0 ) ((e& +  (1 — £) (1 — ^))))
<  (1 — 26) (ao +  (1 — s)  (1 — ao)) +  02a 0 ,
The relationship holds because 6 < e and therefore 6 < Now, evaluate (A.4) at 
7 =  1. It follows that:
e (1 — e) 6  {6 — e) £ ( \  — 6) _  a 0£ ( l  — 6)
* 2 B ( l - e ) 8  +  e ( \ - 8 )  ~  K(1 -  e) 0 +  s  (1 -  d) =  *29( 1  -Soto)  ~  °°
As the LHS is now higher than before, the conditions derived in the previous case 
also apply and 6 can be even lower. Thus, if 6 is low there exists 7 , with 0 < 7 <  1, 
provided that Co < .
(iv) T ypes Tg, T # an d  U b follow th e ir  resp ec tiv e  signals for low values 
o f 6 : Given the equality for Ug in (A.4), Tg strictly prefers to send a favourable
report as pr(G | sq ,T )  > p r(G | sg, U) and F\ (a GG) >  F1 (OqB). Similarly, T b and
U b  always send an unfavourable report because pr(G | sq,U) > p r(G | s b ,U) > 
pr(G | sb ,T)).
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A . 1.2 E stab lish in g  th e  D is t in c t  0 R an ges (and  P r o o f  o f P ro p o ­
sitio n  3)
Defining 9 = Oh as the value of 9 for which (A.l) holds for 7 =  0 and 9 = Ol as the 
value of 9 for which (A.4) holds for 7 =  0, it can be demonstrated that ^  <  0 and
ft— ___ 8lTe
3? > 0. Taking the expressions ire and 7if it can be shown that --§§? >  0. Simple
~w
    _
algebra shows that is positive and tha t ^  is negative. Computing follows
ai
the same logic and is derived to be negative; both 7 =^ and 7^  are positive.
From (A.l) and (A.4) as 9 — ► 1, 7 =  1, and on the other hand, as 9 — ► 0, 
7=  1, for Co sufficiently low. Thus, when 9 G (Oh , 1), there is excessive favourable 
reports (7 > 0) and when 9 G (0, 0 l ), there is excessive unfavourable reports (7 > 0). 
It remains to be shown that 9l < 9 h . Only then can be stated that there is a 
region [0l, 9h\ where there is no deviation from the private signal by the untalented 
certification intermediary. The equality (A.4) evaluated at 9 = 9l  (or 7=  0) is 
identical to (A.l) when this last equality is evaluated at 9 = 9jj (or 7 =  0),  except for 
the probabilities pr(G | sq, U) and pr(G | Sb,U) . Since for a given 9 p r(G \ Sq, U) > 
p r(G | Sb,U) and these probabilities are increasing in 9, the equalities (A.4) and (A.l)) 
require 9l  to be lower than 9h for Co sufficiently small.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is done by implicit differentiation. Starting with | j ,  straightforward differ­
entiation, using (A.l) and the fact tha t Oh  is always higher than it can be shown
o —  p.— d*e
that is always positive. As 7=- is always negative is positive. Turning
SFj
to ^=, it can be proven by simple algebra that ^  is negative if 9 < Otherwise, we
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f t  e  d ' y  —need to use (A.5) in the proof; -g- is positive thus ^  is positive.
— d'y
A.3 Proof of Propositions 5 and 6
The way the equilibrium values for 7 and 7 vary with ao is determined as fol­
lows. Starting with 7 , is found to be negative if Co is sufficiently small and 
making use of condition (A.3) in the derivation. The second derivative TEf is a*' 
ways negative. On the other hand, ^  is always negative hence, ^  is decreasing 
and it can also be proven to be concave in ao- Looking at 7 , is found to be 
negative. This can be proven by straightforward derivation, summing and subtract­
ing ( ___  ^ ( ____ (i-g -(( ( i - £)g+g(i -g))7B+(£g+ (i-£)(i-g))))____ \  d m aking
use of equilibrium condition (A.4) and of technical condition (A.5). The second deriva- 
tive is negative and the higher the cq, the steeper is the slope. As ^  is always 
positive, is respectively increasing and convex in ao-
A.4 Proof of Propositions 10 and 11
In order to prove how the set of prior beliefs for which there is deviation from the 
private signal changes there needs to be a comparison between the expected profits 
functions with and without competition. W ith competition intermediaries decide 
whether to announce their private signals by looking at
7[fi (C/) =  Pr (G | sG,U )F n (o^ q , a j0)+ P r  (B  | sG,U )F n  (a^jg, a ^ - F n  (a!B, a j0)+Co
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and
irei (U) =  P r (G | SB,U)Fa (o*GG,a j0) + P r ( £  | sB,U )F n ( ^ GBiaj0) - F a  ( 4 ) a io)-c&.
The fee in period 1 for the case without competition is Fi (ai) = k, +  ^ w ^ j-
(i) Type Ub randomises for 6 > 0H in the monopolistic case
The different fees with competition are Fn (o^b, &jo) =  0,
Fa {ah a, «jo) = Fi &aa) ~ k
and
Fn f c ,  a j0) =  Fi (aB) -  k
in case WB > ajo and zero otherwise. The remaining probabilities remain the same 
with and without competition. Consequently, when a lB >  oj0
r ‘ (u ) -  r  (to = fc (3j£) (Pr (b  | s B, o ) )  > o.
Therefore, when for a given 6 there is an equilibrium in mixed strategies for the 
monopolistic case, a favourable report is issued with competition. Because W61 (U) is 
increasing in 6, an equilibrium in mixed strategies occurs for a lower 9.
If a lB < ajo, 7rei (U) =  Pr (G \ siB, U) Fn (o?GG, otjo) — Co. For an arbitrarily small 
cq, 7rei (U) is also positive.
(ii) Type Ub randomises for 6 < 6L in the monopolistic case
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In this case, the different fees with competition become Fn ( a ^ p , ajo) =  0, 
F n (o £ o a , a j0) =  Fj. ( a a a ) -  k  ^ ^
and
Fa (a lb , ajo) =  {&b) ~ * ^ ■y- +
in case > a^o and zero otherwise. The remaining probabilities remain the same 
with and without competition. A similar argument is applied here. When > a j0
s i  (to -  2t! (17) = k (2ffi£) (Pr (B I sc, U)) > 0.
Hence, given 6 if m’1(U) = 0 then 7rfl(C7) > 0. Because is increasing in 6, a
mixed strategy with competition occurs for a lower 0.
If a£g < ajo, Tii tele? Qfji) — 0 which means that
Trf! (U) =  Pr (G | sG, */) ^  {qLgg, <*jo) +  Q) > 0
meaning that a good report is always sent.
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A ppendix B 
Auxiliary Calculations for Chapter 
3
B .l Proof of Proposition 12
To implement the first-best decisions at minimum cost (or expected transfer), share­
holders solve:
fm inp(ff) (p (S i  | a) t + p ( S t | a ) t ( a 1S 1)) +  p(a)t (a, S J
+p (a | a) t (a, | a) +  p(a \ a ) ( p ( S i  \ a, a) t (a, Si | a) +  p  (Sx | a7, a) t (a, S x | a))
subject to (3.7), (3.8), (3.11), (3.12) and all t (.) >  0.
It follows immediately that t (<t, S i \ a) and t (a, S i) should be set to zero as this 
relaxes constraints (3.8) and (3.12) without affecting the expected transfer. Intuitively 
this makes sense as it is obvious that fraud has been committed by the auditor.
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Obviously, in this case the auditor should be penalised but because of limited liability 
the minimum transfer is in fact zero. In addition, the optimal t (<f, | a) and t (a, S x)
are also zero as (3.7) and (3.11) are relaxed keeping the expected transfer constant, 
i.e., increasing t (a, S i | a) and t (a, S i) respectively.
The constraints become
p{g_\a)t{g_,S1 \a ) - i )> p { g _ \-& )  —
    q
p(a | a ) p (S i | W ,a)t (a, S i \ a ) - ' i p > { p ( S l \ a ) ~  p(g_ \ tf7) ) * ^ , ^  \ a) - p ( a  \ a) —
P(s)t (s.,SJ) - i / > > p  (a) p (a | a) — 
p(c)p (Si | a) t (o', S i)  > (p (Si)  -  p(o)) t (o, Si) + tp -  ^ p(c)p  (o | o ) .
The constraints define two cones in the positive quadrant of spaces (t (w, S i ) , t (a, 5^)) 
and (t (w,Si \ a) , t (a, S i  | a )), and the optimum is reached when all constraints are 
binding.
The optimum transfers are derived to be: t (a, S i  \ a) =  ^j=y +  § , t (a, S i  \ a) =  
~ f ,  t (a, S i )  =  and t (a, S i)  = jfc -  f .
Because of limited liability all transfers need to be positive. If B  < 2pf P , i.e. the 
private benefit is not too high relative to the cost of effort, all transfers are indeed 
positive. If B  = then t (a, S i \ a) equals zero but when 2p(f P  < B  <
without limited liability, t (a, S i  | a) is negative and all constraints are binding. With 
limited liability, t (a, S i | a) needs to increase to zero. As it increases, the left-hand- 
side of constraint (3.8) increases, meaning that there is no need to vary the right-hand- 
side as the constraint is still satisfied but no longer binding. Decreasing t (a, S i  \ a)
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would mean that (3.8) could be binding again but (3.7) would be violated. If B  > |j£, 
t (a, S i)  also becomes negative. Using the same reasoning as before, t (a, S i)  increases 
to zero and t (a, S t ) remains unchanged.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 13
The optimal contract is the solution to the problem:
min p(ar)p (a, a) (p (Si \ a, a) t  {a, a, S i)  +  p (Sx \ a ,a ) t  {a, a, S ^ )
{ t ( . ) ' s }
+p {a, a) t (a, S_i,a)+ p(a)t {a, S x)
subject to (3.16), (3.17), (3.21), (3.22), (3.23), (3.19) and a ll t( .)  >  0
This problem is solved as before. It follows immediately that t (cr, Si, a) and t (a, S i)  
should be set to zero as this relaxes the constraints without affecting the expected 
transfer. By setting equal to zero, due to limited liability, constraints
(3.16), (3.21) and (3.23) are relaxed. As far as the the remaining relevant constraints 
are concerned one can keep the expected transfer constant by decreasing t(a,S_i,a) 
and increasing t (a, Si, a) without affecting the remaining constraints. The relevant 
constraints can then be simplified to:
t (cl, S i , a) > - ■- y - +  B, p(a | a)
p(a | a) [p (Si | a, a) t (a, S i, a) +  B] -  $  > (p (Si \ a) -  p(a \ a)) t (a, S v  a ) , 
p ( v ) t ( a ,S i )  -  p(a)i) -  Bp(a)p (a \ a) > (p(a) -  p(a)p {a \ a ) ) t ( a , S i , a ) ,
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p{a)p{a | a) (p (Si | a,a) t (a,Si ,a)  + B)
+p{a)p ( a \ a ) t  (a, S 1:a) -  p{a)$ -  ip > {p (SJ  -  p {a))t (a, ),
p(a)p (g_ \ a) t  {a, S l t a ) + p  {a)t{a, S 1) > i p +  p(a)ip + B  (1 -  p(a)p (a \ a))
and
?(£,&) > t & S ^ W ) .
From the constraints it immediately follows that t (a, S_x, a) can decrease still keep­
ing the expected transfer constant (by increasing t(a,S_1) and t (a, Si,cr)). Thus,
t <f) =  ^j=y +  B. The constraints simplify to
K ’ ~  eP { s 1) 
t (s.,S_i) > - 7— + B,p(u | a)
( q _ w  (p(£i) - P ( s ) ) r , _  q , p(g) „
t {a ,Su a) - p( g j  + t f a S i )  p f s , ) 13’
and,
t f c i i i )  >  / ^  _x +  B. p{g_ | a)
The transfer t ((T,jSi) should also be set equal to max |^ = y  +  B,  +  J9 j as min­
imising t relaxes the constraints. If no cost savings, i.e., ip — ip or ,in fact, for
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any ^  i) =  + B .  l i t  f c S , )  = +  B, it follows that
v J 6v v
If t (a, S x) =  +  B  the remaining constraint simplifies to
t ( a , S u a) > ^ ~ B .
Finally, the transfers need to be positive: if) is lower than ^  and both need to be high 
enough relative to the private benefit to ensure that happens.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 11
Shareholders expected utility when a single auditor is hired, VF5, is the following:
p(S  | a,a)p(a,a)  (uS2 + (1 — u ) S 2 — I ) — p(S \ a ,a)p(a ,a) t  (a, S i,<x)
+p{S | W)p ( o r )  ( ( 1  -  u ) S 2 + uS2 -  I) -  p(a)t (a, S J - p  (a) p{a \ a)t (a, S ^ W ) , 
whereas in the multiple auditor case, W 2 is:
p(S | a,a)p(a,a)  (uS2 + (l — u ) S 2 — I) -  p(S \ a,a)p(ar,a) (t (a, Si) + t ( a , S i  \ a)) 
+p(S | W)p ( a ) ( ( l - u ) S 2 + uS2 -  I) -  p{(j)t (a, S j - p  (a) p(a \ a)t (a, Sx | a)
and the difference equals:
A = - p ( S  | a,a)p(a,a)  (t (a, Su'd) -  t (a, Si) -  t (a, Si | cr))
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- p (m) (*(£,&) (£,&)) - p W p f e  I <r) (*(£,& >00 -*(£>& I <*)) •
W ith no private benefits and no cost savings:
A  = ± _  # ( g )
e 1 - 9
It happens that t (<f, Si, a) is always lower than t ( a J'S) + t (a, S i | a) and if v is 
high enough, the probability of paying the ’’cheaper” t (a, S i, a) rather than transfer 
t (a, ~S)+t (a, S i | a) is higher (think for example as v —> 1) and on the other hand it is 
less likely to pay the ’’expensive” t in fact, the term p(a) (t(a,S_i) —t
becomes less significant.
W ith low cost savings only:
that is definitely higher than ^ W ith high cost savings:
A ,
which is always positive.
W ith private benefits only:
that is definitely lower than ^ When the private benefit is very high:
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which is definitely lower than before and always negative as 'ip < 3 ^ .  Hence, as the 
private benefit increases, and with limited liability, A is gradually decreasing.
Finally, with both private benefits and cost savings, there is a combination of the 
individual effects of the two previous cases. The bottom line is that, with cost savings, 
a higher private benefit is needed to turn A negative.
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A ppendix C
Auxiliary Calculations for Chapter
C .l Simplification of Expression (4.6)




-  6 — x* . — 6* — x A
o =  and o = ---------
a  G
and taking into account the fact that
the expression can be rewritten as:






F ~ l I 1 -  ^  I ' I d z a
0 * -x *
OOoo
g-S*
and expression (4.7) is obtained by straightforward manipulation.
C.2 Comparative Statics
The failure point 6*, varies with a  as follows:
Hence,
d<9* „  t D/c
"5~  — 5  +  &----- - .da a z
dx* u k  dF  1 (.) Q
 = B  + b  -  -  a — -----
a 1da a 2 d  ( l —
and
da a 2 d ( l  — a 2B
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Since, dFa  ^^  is always positive the effect of a change in a  is lower in ^  and ^  than
in Or-. On the other hand, 6* also varies with the size of the large creditor loan B  as:
dO* db db ^
d B ~ a + a d B  d B U
since the sum of both types of debt has to equal D, and increase of B  implies a 
decrease of 6, therefore,
dO* ^
~ d B ~ U'
Hence,
dx* dO*
~dB ~  ~dB
and,
dy* dd* d F - 1 ( l - ^ g )  L— TdB  d B  a ( l - J ^ )  a B 2' 
Since - F-^ ^  is always positive, the signal of ^  is ambiguous.
C.3 Sequential Game
Knowing that if the large creditor fails to renegotiate, the firm defaults and liquidates, 
the default point 6 in case of acceptance by the large creditor, is given by the same 
expression as before:
0 =  K  +  a B  +  ab +  u  (x, o'j (k — ab)
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and the critical point that is now denoted by y is also defined as,
L = Pr (o > 6 | x, y > y j^ P r (o > 6 \ y^ j a B  +  P r (o < 6 \ x, y > y j^ L
that can be rewritten as,
V =  8 - tF~'
The small creditors critical point, denoted in this section by x , equates the payoff of 
agreeing
Pr (d < 6 | y > y, x j^ I +  Pr (o > 6 \ y > y, x j^ ab 
to the payoff when he refuses
Pr (o < 6 | y > y, x j^ I +  Pr (o > 6 \ y > y, 5^ b.
Using the same transformations as before, the small creditor’s posterior probability
assessment of default conditional upon observing the large creditor decision for x* can 
be expressed as
Pr >  6 — x — r F ~ l ( l -
Pr ( ti] - a £ i > 6 - x - tF ~1 ( l  -
Rewriting as
Pr (e, > ^ , ^ - 6 ^ ^ -  I F- '  (1 -  ^ ) )
Pr ( ^  -  e, > %* -  5 F -1 ( 1 - ^ ) )
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and as J  —> 0 it simplifies to
Pr ( > ¥ )
and again this implies that x  —► — oo. But note that in this case, the payoff received 
in case of liquidation never plays any role (even if it did not cancel out) because if 
Pr (<9 < 0 | y >  y, equals zero, Pr ^0 < 0 | y > y, x j^ will also necessarily be equal 
to zero. And in the previous case small creditors always agree to renegotiate and wait 
for the large creditor to decide what is best whereas here they always mimic the large 
creditor behaviour.
If the large creditor is less informed, the problem becomes similar to the case of 
simultaneous renegotiation when ^ —► 00. This is because the probability of default 
given the large creditor’s acceptance decision from the small creditors point of view 
is:
P r (e, > ^ , r n - a S i > e - x - r F ~1 ( l  -  ^ ) )
or
and taking the limit the probability becomes:
Pr ( 1 - & ) )
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Given independence of e* and 77, the probability of default is simply Pr
